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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a Decree of Divorce entered in the 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
on May 12, 1989• Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend the Judgment 
or For Relief From the Judgment which was denied on August 31, 
1989. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal 
pursuant to Rules 3 and 4, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals and 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2A-3(2)(g) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Court abused its discretion in only awarding 
plaintiff alimony in the sum of $1,800.00 per month in light of 
the disparity between the parties1 incomes, the length of the 
marriage, and the defendants needs and lack of specified job 
training or skills. 
2. Whether the Court abused its discretion in basing the 
award of alimony to the defendant using the current income of the 
plaintiff at the time of trial to establish his ability to pay 
alimony while at the same time basing the parties1 standard of 
living on the reduced income earned by the plaintiff during the 
years 1981 through 1986. 
3. Whether the Court abused its discretion by failing to 
consider, as an expense of sale, the capital gains tax 
consequences to be assessed against each party on the sale of the 
California home prior to equal distribution of the equity 
therein. 
4. Whether the Court abused its discretion in awarding an 
equal division of the net equity from the California home in 
light of the parties disparate ability to pay capital gains 
taxes. 
STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) (1989). 
Disposition of property — Maintenance of health care 
of parties and children — court to have continuing 
jurisdiction — custody and visitation — termination of 
alimony -- non-meritorious petition for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may 
include in it equitable orders relating to the children, 
property, and parties. 
. . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Walter James Howell, the Plaintiff-Respondent in this 
case, filed a complaint against his wife, the Defendant-
Appellant. Mrs. Barbara Joyce Howell filed a counterclaim, 
seeking a decree of divorce, alimony, child support, a fair and 
equitable division of the real and personal property, and 
attorney's fees. 
The case was tried before the Honorable Frank G. Noel on 
December 22, 1988, and completed on January 19, 1989. Each side 
was represented by counsel and presented documentary evidence, as 
well as their own testimonies. In addition, Mr. Howell presented 
the testimony of two witnesses, one who offered testimony 
regarding the pension plans available to him, and the other who 
offered testimony regarding the availability of employment to his 
wife. Mrs. Howell presented one additional witness who testified 
as to the tax benefits available to her husband upon the payment 
of alimony to her and as to the capital gains taxes which would 
be assessed against the parties upon the sale of the California 
home. After hearing closing arguments, the trial court issued 
its ruling. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree 
of Divorce were signed and entered on May 12, 1989. 
The ruling of the trial court applicable to the issues on 
appeal was as follows: 
1. It awarded defendant alimony in the amount of $1,800.00 
per month, payable in two equal payments on the 1st and 15th days 
of each month, until the defendant remarried, cohabited or until 
further order of the Court. 
2. It ordered that the California home be sold, and that 
the equity remaining in the home, after cost of sale, be divided 
equally between the parties. 
Copies of the Findings, Conclusions and Decree are attached 
hereto in the Addendum as Exhibits "A" and "B" and by reference 
incorporated herein. 
The plaintiff subsequently filed a Motion to Amend the 
Judgment or for Relief From the Judgment, which was denied on 
August 31, 1989. Defendant filed her Notice of Appeal on 
September 28, 19 89. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
MARITAL HISTORY 
The parties were married on October 14, 1956, in Cushing, 
Oklahoma (Tr. 31). Shortly after their marriage, Mr. Howell 
began working for Western Airlines as a pilot (Tr. 38). During 
the marriage, the parties moved a number of times, (Tr, 39) and 
Mrs. Howell was primarily a full-time homemaker and mother, only 
working now and then on a part-time basis (Tr. 78). Five 
children were born as issue of this marriage, and at the time of 
trial, four were emancipated and one was a minor child, namely 
Sean Daniel Howell, born August 21, 1972 (Tr. 31). The parties 
separated on November 22, 1986. 
EMPLOYMENT HISTORY 
From 19 5 7 through 19 84, Mr. Howell was employed as an 
airline pilot for Western Airlines. Western Airlines was taken 
over by Delta Airlines in 1985, and he was thereafter employed as 
an airline pilot for Delta Airlines from 1985 through the time of 
trial (Tr. 40). In 1984,- plaintiff's employer, then Western 
Airlines, suffered severe financial problems, and asked its 
pilots to accept a wage reduction (Tr. 113). The parties agreed, 
and as a result, the family experienced a financial strain during 
that period of time (Tr. 217) because Mr. Howell received no 
increases in compensation even though the cost of living was 
increasing (Tr. 115). During the period 1981 through 1986, Mr. 
Howell's average yearly income was approximately $67,000.00 or 
$5,500.00 per month. 
In 1986, after Delta took over operation of the airlines, 
Mr. Howell began receiving increased compensation (Tr. 114). At 
the time of trial in December of 1988, he was earning 
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approximately $10,120.00 per month (Tr. 45). 
Defendant Mrs. Howell, at time of trial, was working as a 
part-time sales clerk for Casual Furniture and was earning a 
gross income of $649.80 per month (Tr. 75). This employment was 
scheduled to end on December 31, 1988 because her employer was 
going out of business. (Tr. 75). Despite defendant's 
applications to several potential employers to find new 
employment, she had not been hired as of the time of trial, due 
to the fact that she did not have sufficient experience (Tr. 72). 
Mrs. Howell graduated from high school in 1956, and has had 
no formal training, with the exception of approximately 30 hours 
of college courses taken at a junior college several years 
earlier (Tr. 70). Throughout the marriage, her part-time 
employment consisted primarily of unskilled labor, and included 
working as an aid in a day care center (Tr. 73); working as a 
secretary (Tr. 74); selling cosmetics (Tr. 74); working as a 
switchboard operator (Tr. 75); and teaching piano lessons out of 
her home (Tr. 72). 
Mrs. Howell's monthly living expenses at time of trial were 
$5,021.30 (Tr. 233-34) . 
The Court made the following specific Findings related to 
the plaintiff's income (Tr. 265): 
5. At the time of the separation of the 
parties, the plaintiff was earning between 
$5,500.00 per month and $5,600.00 per month 
and had been earning this sum for five years 
prior to this time. . . . 
6. The court believes the income level of 
$5,500.00 reflects the income level and 
living standards of the parties during the 
last five years of their lives together. 
7. The plaintiff earns, from his present 
employment, a salary of $10,000.00 per month. 
The court has determined in setting alimony 
that while $5,500.00 per month represents the 
living standards of the parties in the last 5 
years of the marriage, when the parties 
resided together, the ability of the 
plaintiff to pay alimony is based upon his 
present income of $10,000.00 per month. 
The Court made the following specific Finding related to the 
defendant's earning ability (Tr. 265): 
8. The defendant earns, or is capable of 
earning, $7,500.00 per year, or $625.00 per 
month. At the time of trial, defendant was 
employed with Casual Furniture on a part-time 
basis earning a gross income of $649.80 per 
month, although that employment was scheduled 
to end on December 31, 1988 and she had not 
yet secured replacement employment. 
CALIFORNIA RESIDENCE 
During the marriage, the parties acquired two homes, one in 
California (Tr. 57) and one in Utah (Tr. 58). The court found 
that the California home was valued at $290,000.00 (Tr. 248) with 
a current mortgage of $23,631.00 (Tr. 248). The court also found 
that the Utah home was valued at $140,000.00 (Tr. 248) with a 
current mortgage of $123,000.00 (Tr. 248). Mr. Howell testified 
at trial that he wanted to sell the California home and divide 
the remaining equity (Tr. 103). Mrs. Howell testified at trial 
that she wanted to reside in the California home for personal as 
well as financial reasons (Tr. 214-216). She also called Mark 
Papanikolas, a certified public accountant and certified 
financial planner (Tr. 165-166) as an expert to testify as to the 
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Plaintiff's tax benefits derived from the payment of alimony and 
as to the parties' potential tax liability on the sale of the 
California home. He testified that, based on Mr. Howell's 1988 
payroll schedule, he would enjoy a substantial tax benefit by his 
payment of alimony (Tr. 199). For every dollar paid, Mr. Howell 
would save 33 cents (Tr. 199). 
Mr. Papanikolas also testified that the capital gains tax on 
the realized equity from the sale of the California home would 
total $23,400.00 (Tr. 201). His testimony also addressed the IRS 
requirements for qualifying for a tax exclusion or for "rolling 
over" this tax, one of which is that the California residence 
must be the primary residence of the parties (Tr. 184-185). 
On this issue, Mr. Papanikolas stated as follows: 
I don't think that it's possible to conclude 
affirmatively that the California home would 
be their primary residence unless Mr. and 
Mrs. Howell could prove that it was always 
their intent to return to California and to 
live in that home and the move to Salt Lake 
was temporary, and a number of things in line 
with that, then it would possible that that 
could be considered a primary residence. 
The Internal Revenue Service may well take 
the position if the return were audited, when 
the home was sold, that that was not their 
primary residence because they moved to Salt 
Lake City because they purchased another home 
here and abandoned that as their primary 
residence. So I think it would be very 
difficult to say that you could use the 
provisions of Section 1034 to roll over any 
gain. 
(Tr. 185 Lines 4-18). 
Even if the parties could establish that the California 
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residence was their primary residence and thereby qualify to roll 
over the capital gains taxes incurred on its sale, Mrs. Howell 
testified that she was afraid that she would be financially 
unable to purchase another home in California, of greater value 
so as to roll over her capital gains taxes at that time (Tr. 
215-216). Therefore, she requested the court to address the 
capital gains taxes as an expense in the event the court ordered 
the property sold. In the alternative, she asked the court to 
consider the parties1 disparate ability to pay the tax and to 
adjust the division of equity accordingly (Tr. 198). The court 
failed to consider either option. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court's award of alimony failed to take into 
consideration the three factors relevant to alimony: (1) the 
needs of Mrs. Howell, which were established at $5,021.30 per 
month; (2) her inability to meet those needs on her own due to 
her age, limited work experience and lack of formal education and 
skills; and (3) Mr. Howell's substantial ability to pay alimony 
based on his income at time of trial, in excess of $10,000.00 per 
month. The award should be vacated and increased. 
2. The trial court erred by failing to measure the parties' 
standard of living based on their income and needs at the time of 
trial. Instead the trial court based it on a life style 
maintained by the parties during a period when Mr. Howell's 
income was unusually low. Therefore, the alimony award should be 
vacated and increased, and this court should articulate a method 
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as to how and when the parties' standard of living should be 
measured. 
3. The trial court failed to consider the immediate and 
concrete tax consequences precipitated by the court ordered sale 
of the California residence. As this failure resulted in an 
inequitable division of the net equity resulting from that sale, 
the property division as to the California residence should be 
vacated and the issue remanded. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED THE 
DISPARITY IN THE PARTIES1 INCOMES, THE LENGTH 
OF THE MARRIAGE, AND THE RESPECTIVE EARNING 
ABILITIES AND EXPENSES OF THE PARTIES IN 
MAKING ITS ALIMONY AWARD 
The purpose of alimony is to "enable the receiving spouse to 
maintain as nearly as possible the standard of living enjoyed 
during the marriage and prevent the spouse from becoming a public 
charge." Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986); Jones 
v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). 
In making its alimony award, the court must consider all 
relevant factors affecting one spouse's ability to provide for 
herself and the other's ability to pay support. As summarized by 
the Utah Supreme Court in Olsen v. Olsen, 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 
1985) : 
An alimony should, as far as possible, 
equalize the parties1 respective standards of 
living and maintain them at a level as close 
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as possible to the standard of living enjoyed 
during the marriage. In determining the 
amount of alimony to be awarded, it was 
necessary for the trial court to consider the 
financial condition and needs of the 
plaintiff, her ability to produce a 
sufficient income for herself/ and the 
ability of the defendant to provide support. 
Id. at 566 (footnotes omitted). 
Pursuant to this standard, the lower court in this case 
abused its discretion in awarding a lower amount of alimony to 
Mrs. Howell than her needs, and than the plaintiff's ability to 
provide, would mandate. The court found that, for the purposes 
of awarding alimony, the plaintiff's income averaged $5,600.00 
per month during the years 1981 through 1986, the last five years 
the parties resided together during their marriage. However, it 
based Plaintiff's ability to pay alimony on his income at time of 
trial, $10,120.00 per month (Tr. 265). At the time of trial, Mrs. 
Howell was earning $645.00 per month and her living expenses were 
over $5,000.00 per month (Tr. 229). 
In addition to child support of $1,363.00, the court awarded 
Defendant monthly alimony in the amount of $1,80 0.00. The minor 
child will turn 18 on August 21, 1990, and the child support 
payment will terminate. If we analyze the court's award of 
alimony under the three factors set forth in Olsen v. Olsen, 
suprj*, as well as the cases of Asper v. Asper, 753 P. 2d 978 (Utah 
App. 1988); Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 144 (Utah App. 1988); 
and Sampinos v. Sampinos, 750 P.2d 615 (Utah App. 1988), it is 
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clear the court abused its discretion, and Mrs. Howell is 
entitled to a greater amount of alimony. 
First of all, the court must consider the financial 
condition and needs of the recipient spouse. At the time of the 
trial, Mrs. Howell was employed on a part-time basis as a 
furniture sales clerk, earning $7.00 per hour (Tr. 75). Her 
employment was scheduled to terminate on December 31, 1988, due 
tQ the fact that the store was closing (Tr. 75). At trial, Mrs. 
Howell testified that her monthly living expenses were $5,021.30, 
and these were compiled from actual expenses recorded in her 
check book register (Tr. 233). She had been unable to make ends 
meet with the combined amount of temporary support of $2,400.00 
per month that she had been receiving from the Plaintiff, and her 
own small salary (Tr. 211). In fact, she had to borrow money to 
meet her expenses on two separate occasions (Tr. 215). Mrs. 
Howell asked the court for an award of alimony in the amount of 
$3,500.00 per month, and an additional amount of $500.00 for 
child support. As in the Sampinos case, supra, there were no 
income producing assets awarded to the defendant in the divorce, 
and her only means of support would be the small income she could 
generate through her own efforts, and any additional amounts the 
court ordered plaintiff to pay. 
The second factor to be considered by the court is the 
defendant's ability to produce sufficient income for herself. In 
the instant case, Mrs. Howell has a high school education, 
nominal additional formal training, and limited work experience. 
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At the time of trial, she was in her mid-fifties, with no 
professional training and limited marketable skills. Her limited 
work experience, during the 32 years of the parties1 marriage, 
was in relatively unskilled jobs. During most of the marriage, 
including the separations, Mrs. Howell devoted her time to 
raising the parties1 children and maintaining the parties1 home. 
It is unrealistic to assume that Mrs. Howell, in light of her age 
and limited work experience and training, would be able to enter 
the work force and support herself in a style resembling that 
which she would have had if the marriage had continued. Needless 
to say, the standard of living she would have enjoyed had the 
marriage continued would have been based on an annual income in 
excess of $120,000.00. At the time of trial, Plaintiff's income 
exceeded $10,000.00 per month. The alimony award of $1,800.00 is 
less than one-fifth of Plaintiff's monthly income, and not an 
adequate amount to allow Defendant to meet her basic needs and 
expenses much less maintain a comparable standard of living. 
The last factor the court must consider in making an award 
of alimony is the paying spouse's ability to provide support. 
The record clearly demonstrates the Plaintiff's ability to 
provide adequate support for the Defendant. Based upon his 
monthly income at time of trial which was in excess of $10,000.00 
per month, it is clear that he has an ability to pay defendant a 
greater amount of support than what was awarded. In addition, 
uncontroverted evidence at trial established that Mr. Howell 
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would realize a substantial tax benefit of 33 cents for every 
dollar of alimony paid to his wife. 
In light of Mrs. Howell's financial needs, her inability to 
meet those needs and Mr. Howell's substantial ability to pay, the 
court abused its discretion in only awarding Mrs. Howell alimony 
in the amount of $1,800.00 per month. This court should vacate 
that award and enter its own award based on the evidence 
contained in the record. In the alternative, this court should 
remand to the lower court for a redetermination of an adequate 
award of alimony. In either event, the increase of alimony award 
should be made retroactive to the date of trial. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ALIMONY 
BASED UPON 
STANDARD OF 
ITS MEASUREMENT OF 
LIVING DURING THE 
THE 
YEARS 
PARTIES' 
1981 TO 
1986 
The court found that Mr. Howell's ability to pay alimony was 
based upon his monthly income at time of trial of $10,000.00. 
However, inconsistently with this finding, the court determined 
that the standard of living enjoyed by the parties during the 
marriage was based on Mr. Howell's average income from 1981 to 
1986 of $5,500.00 per month. This figure represented the reduced 
compensation the parties agreed to accept from Western Airlines 
knowing that their income level would substantially increase once 
the take over of Western by Delta was accomplished. This 
measurement of the standard of living was an abuse of discretion. 
Utah law requires consideration of the standard of living 
enjoyed by the parties during the marriage in making a 
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determination of the amount of alimony to be awarded to the 
recipient spouse. For example, in the case of Naranjo v. 
Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah App. 1988) the Utah Court of Appeals 
stated: 
[Alimony] should, so far as possible, 
equalize the parties1 'respective standards 
of living and maintain them at a level as 
close as possible to the standard of living 
enjoyed during the marriage.1 (citations 
omitted) f[T]he ultimate test of the 
propriety of an alimony award is whether, 
given all of these factors, the party 
receiving alimony will be able to support 
him- or herself as nearly as possible to the 
standard of living . . . enjoyed during the 
marriage.f 
Id. at 1147. (citations omitted). 
Although the courts mandate this consideration of the 
standard of living in fashioning an alimony award, Utah courts 
have never defined the term or articulated a formula for 
measuring a specific standard of living. One case even suggests 
that the appropriate standard is that which the parties would 
have enjoyed had the marriage continued. In Savage v. Savage, 
658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Where a marriage is of long duration and the 
earning capacity of one spouse greatly 
exceeds that of the other, as here, it is 
appropriate to order alimony and child 
support at a level which will insure that the 
supported spouse and children may maintain a 
standard of living not unduly disportionate 
to that which they would have enjoyed had the 
marriage continued. 
Id. at 1205 (emphasis added) (See also Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 
P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah App. 1988)). 
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This inconsistency and lack of a precise definition is 
generally not a problem because the standard of living enjoyed by 
the parties during the marriage is usually comparable to that 
which exists at the time of trial. However, in this case, the 
parties had accepted a temporary reduction in compensation in 
exchange for retention of Mr. Howell's employment and the 
expectation of substantially increased compensation in the 
future. During the years 1981 to 1986, the parties suffered 
financial strain as a result of this decision and did not enjoy 
the standard of living at that time which they anticipated they 
would enjoy in the future. However, the court used an average 
yearly income over that five-year period to arrive at a standard 
of living based on an average income of $5,500.00 per month. 
This was error in several respects. 
First, the lower income level was a result of the parties1 
conscious decision to defer present benefits in exchange for 
greater future benefits. 
Second, Mr. Howell was receiving the increased benefits as 
early as 1987, and at time of trial in December of 1988 was 
earning in excess of $10,000.00 per month, or nearly double the 
yearly average used by the court. 
Third, under the standard outlined in Savage, supra, the 
court must consider the standard of living the parties would have 
enjoyed had the marriage continued. 
Finally, a determination of the standard of living at the 
time of trial would be consistent with the requirement that 
1 S 
marital assets be valued at time of trial. In Berger v. Berger, 
713 P.2d 695 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court held that "[t]he 
marital estate should be valued at the time of the divorce 
decree." Id. at 697. (See also Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 
1218 (Utah 1980) . 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court's use of a standard 
of living based on Mr. Howell's past income of $5,500.00 per 
month was error and an abuse of discretion. Therefore, the award 
of alimony to the Defendant should be vacated, and this court 
should award Defendant an amount of alimony consistent with the 
evidence presented at trial, or in the alternative, remand the 
issue to the trial court. In either event, this court must 
provide guidance, define the term and time frame to be used, or 
articulate a formula for the trial court to measure an accurate 
standard of living. 
Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE 
CAPITAL GAINS TAX CONSEQUENCES OF THE SALE OF 
THE CALIFORNIA RESIDENCE PRIOR TO DIVIDING 
THE NET EQUITY DERIVED FROM THAT SALE 
Trial courts are granted broad discretion to equitably 
divide marital assets pursuant to Utah statutory and case law. 
An even distribution of assets is not always required to achieve 
equity and fairness. Courts have long recognized that expenses 
of an asset should be deducted prior to a determination and 
16 
division of the net equity in that asset. For example, in the 
case of Asper v. Asper, 753 P.2d 978 (Utah App. 1988), the Utah 
Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's deduction of the 
expense of the anticipated real estate commission prior to the 
division of the equity in the marital home. In so doing, the 
court stated: 
The deduction of anticipated real estate 
charges seems to be reasonable as each party 
was charged with half of those charges. 'In 
the distribution of the marital estate, there 
is no fixed rule or formula. . . . The 
responsibility of the trial court is to 
endeavor to provide a just and equitable 
adjustment of their economic resources so 
that the parties might reconstruct their 
lives on a happy and useful basis.' 
Id. at 982 (quoting Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 
1978)) . 
Although the Utah courts have not addressed the 
consideration and treatment of tax consequences resulting from a 
court ordered sale of a marital asset, the issue has been 
addressed in other jurisdictions. One of the earliest cases in 
which the issue of taxes was addressed is In re Marriage of 
Epstein, 154 Cal. Rptr. 413, 592 P.2d 1165 (Cal. 1978). A copy 
of this case is included in the addendum as Exhibit "C" . In that 
case, the wife appealed the trial court's order that the family 
residence be sold and the proceeds divided equally between the 
parties. She argued that the trial court erred by not expressly 
considering tax liability in the division of those proceeds. The 
Supreme Court of California agreed and stated: 
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The trial court's order does not mention the 
possibility that the parties might incur 
state and federal capital gains tax liability 
as a result of the sale of the residence. 
Noting that equalization of community 
property shares before taxes may result in 
her receiving less than half of the net value 
of community property remaining after payment 
of taxes, wife contends the trial court erred 
by not expressly considering tax liability in 
its order. We agree with wife that the 
court's division of community property should 
take account of any taxes actually paid as a 
result of the court ordered sale of the 
residence . . . 
Id. at 1171. Although the court found that the trial court's 
order could be interpreted so as to avoid reversible error, and 
although California is a community property state unlike Utah, 
the principal outlined by the California Supreme Court is 
applicable to this case. The case concluded that the trial court 
must consider tax consequences where a taxable event has occurred 
during the marriage or will occur in connection with the division 
of property. 
The Supreme Court of Montana was faced with a similar issue 
in the case of In re Marriage of Beck, 631 P.2d 282 (Mont. 1981). 
A copy of this case is included in the Addendum as Exhibit "D". 
In that case the Montana Supreme Court held that the trial court 
must consider the concrete and immediate tax consequences 
precipitated by a court ordered sale of marital property. In so 
holding, the court stated: 
[W]here a property distribution ordered by a 
court includes a taxable event precipitating 
a concrete and immediate tax liability, such 
tax liability should be considered by the 
court before entering its final judgment. 
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In re Marriage of Gilbert, (1981), Mont. 628 
P.2d 1088, 38 St. Rep. 743, we held that a 
District Court does not abuse its discretion 
by refusing to consider theoretical tax 
consequences when the court-ordered property 
distribution does not contemplate any taxable 
event which triggers present tax liability. 
But where a present tax liability will be 
triggered by the court-ordered distribution, 
the court must make allowance for such 
impact. Other courts have held that a 
property distribution must make allowance for 
the tax impact incurred by a husband on 
account of a court ordered transfer of an 
interest in real property to the wife. See, 
e.g., Wahl v. Wahl, (1968), 39 Wis. 2d 510, 
159 N.W.2d 651. See generally, Annot. Divorce 
or Separation; Consideration of tax 
liability or consequences in determining 
alimony or property settlement provisions, 51 
A.L.R. 3rd 461. We hold, therefore, that at 
a new hearing, the trial court must consider 
any concrete and" immediate adverse tax impa"ct 
that a division of marital property might 
have on the parties. 
Id. at 285 (emphasis added). 
These cases are consistent with what has been outlined as 
the generally accepted rule with respect to the deduction of 
expenses prior to a division of net equity in a marital asset. 
This general rule has been outlined in 24 Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and 
Separation, § 926. This section states: 
While the courts generally recognize the 
rule, also stated in some statutes, that the 
tax consequences of any equitable 
distribution is a factor to be considered by 
the court, since disregarding the effect of 
taxes may result in an unrealistic and unjust 
result, it has frequently been said that a 
court is not required to consider theoretical 
tax consequences of transactions that are not 
necessary or probable but merely conjectural. 
Thus, in making an equitable distribution, a 
court need not take into account the fact 
that the husband is in the 50% tax bracket 
1 ft 
where the divorce itself does not cause 
immediate taxable consequences. And it is 
too speculative to reduce the value of assets 
based on alleged tax consequences of the 
selling husband's assets for purposes of the 
property division in the absence of a showing 
of what assets would have to be sold at any 
given time. On the other handy where the 
sale of real estate is required or is likely 
to occur within a short time after 
dissolution, the court should consider the 
tax consequences. 
(Footnotes omitted and emphasis added). 
Although the Utah courts have not specifically ruled on this 
issue, the courts have recognized that tax liability is an issue 
where there is evidence that such tax liability is concrete and 
immediate. In Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983), the 
Utah Supreme Court sanctioned the trial court's reservation of 
the issue of which party would bear the tax liability associated 
with the court ordered transfer of stock until such time as the 
liability could be specifically determined. (See Savage, 658 
P.2d at 1204) . 
Applying these principals to the case currently on appeal, 
the trial court erred in not considering the capital gains tax 
consequences to both parties from the sale of the California 
residence for the following reasons. First, the sale of the 
residence was a court ordered sale, and the parties' tax 
liability could be determined within a short period after final 
dissolution, thereby making the liability neither theoretical nor 
speculative. Second, Defendant's expert testified that the tax 
liability, based on the values adduced at trial, would be 
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$23,400.00. Third, he also testified that there was some 
uncertainty as to whether the parties could qualify to roll over 
any gains realized and therefore avoid paying the tax. Finally, 
Mrs. Howell testified that she could not afford a home of greater 
value in order to personally avoid the tax consequences. 
In light of these circumstances, the court's failure to 
consider the tax consequences of the court ordered sale of the 
marital residence was reversible error. As a result, Mrs. 
Howell's ultimate share of equity in the home will be diminished 
and the property division rendered inequitable. The court should 
have considered the tax consequences as an expense of sale, or in 
the alternative, adjusted the division of the net equity to 
compensate Mrs. Howell for her disparate ability to pay the tax. 
Either option was necessary to achieve fairness. This court 
should vacate the division of net equity in the California home 
and remand the issue for a redetermination in light of the 
concrete and immediate tax consequences precipitated by the sale 
of real property. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in two respects: its inadequate award 
of alimony and its inequitable division of the net equity in the 
California home. 
This was a 32-year marriage, and the disparity between the 
parties1 respective earnings was enormous. At time of trial, Mr. 
Howell was earning in excess of $120,000.00 per year. Mrs. 
Howell, by comparison, was earning approximately $7,500.00 per 
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year. Due to her limited education, and lack of marketable 
skills Mrs. Howell is not capable of earning a greater amount. 
The trial court only awarded Mrs. Howell $1,800.00 per month 
as alimony in the face of monthly expenses which exceeded 
$5,000.00. The trial court also erred by measuring the standard 
of living available to the parties based on Mr. Howell's income 
during the years 1981 through 1986, instead of on the parties1 
respective incomes at time of trial. 
The court should vacate the alimony order, and make its own 
increased award consistent with the evidence in the record. In 
the alternative, the issue should be remanded to the trial court, 
with specific instruction on the proper measurement of the 
standard of living applicable to an award of alimony. In either 
event, the increased alimony award should be made retroactive to 
the date of trial. 
The trial court also erred in dividing the net equity from 
the sale of the California residence without considering the 
immediate and concrete tax consequences, precipitated by that 
sale. As a result, its division of that equity was inequitable 
and should be vacated and remanded. 
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of February, 1990. 
^ L H / J J ^ ^ I S (USB # 1956) 
HELEN W. CHRISTIAN (USB # 2247) 
KIM M. LUHN (USB # 5105) 
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ADDENDUM 
; DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
of and for 
; COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
i Attorneys for Plaintiff 
I 525 East 100 South, Suite 500 
!
 P.O. Box 11008 
i Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
' Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
! * * * * * 
; WALTER JAMES HOWELL, ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
1
 Plaintiff, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
• BARBARA JOYCE HOWELL, ) Civil No. D87-4343 
) Judge Frank Noel 
j Defendant. ) 
|: * * * * * 
j j 
i| The above-entitled matter came before the court for 
i| 
j; trial on Thursday, the 22nd day of December, 1988, the 
l"j Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding. The plaintiff was present 
l| in person and represented by counsel, David S. Dolowitz and 
• i 
!! John Mason. The defendant was present in person and 
il represented by counsel, Paul H. Liapis. The court heard and 
H 
j considered the testimony of the parties, received exhibits 
ji 
ij into evidence and determined to take the matter under 
11 
|| advisement. Thereafter, being advised in the premises, the 
EXHIBIT & 
j] court announced its decision in open court on the 19th day of 
|| 
j| January, 1989* The plaintiff then submitted proposed Findings 
j| 
jj of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree to the court, 
|| 
|i provisions to which defendant objected. Those objections were 
ij 
I heard and resolved before the court on April 27, 1989. 
jl Accordingly, the court now makes and enters the following as 
si . 
I! lts 
ji 
II FINDINGS OF FACT 
!i 
;j 1. The defendant was a resident of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, when this action was filed and had been so for 
I more than three months immediately prior thereto. 
I 2. The parties are husband and wife, having been 
I married on October 14, 1956, in Cushing, Oklahoma. 
I 3. Irreconcilable differences arose between the 
j parties which they attempted to reconcile, but were unable to 
i! 
jl do so. 
ji 
4. There were five (5) children born as issue of this 
j marriage; four (4) are emancipated. Both of the parties 
! agreed that care, custody and control of the one (1) remaining 
!| minor child of the parties, Sean Daniel Howell, born August 
|l 21, 1972, age 16, should be awarded to the defendant, subject 
|! to reasonable rights of visitation in the plaintiff. The 
defendant is a fit and proper parent to be awarded the care, 
jl custody and control of the minor child of the parties. 
II 2 i!!
\\ 
• i 
»! 
II 
!i 
1 1 
i ; 
h 
ii 
j! 5. At the time of the separation of the parties, the 
: i 
j! plaintiff was earning between $5,500.00 per month and 
ji 
ji $5, 600. 00 per month and had been earning this sum for five 
• i years prior to this time. After separation, the plaintiff 
i filed an action for divorce which he dismissed at trial; that 
after a two-day attempted reconciliation, he filed this 
j; action. 
;| 6. The court believes the income level of $5, 500. 00 
''reflects the income level and living standards of the parties 
;! during the last five years of their lives together. 
!i 7. The plaintiff earns, from his present employment, 
is a salary of $10,000.00 per month. The court has determined in 
ii 
'j setting alimony that while $5,500.00 per month represents the 
ji 
j; living standards of the parties in the last 5 years of the 
I: 
j| marriage, when the parties resided together, the ability of 
ji 
|i the plaintiff to pay alimony is based upon his present income 
ii 
jl of $10,000.00 per month. 
jl 8. The defendant e'arn0# or is capable of earning, 
!! 
j| $7, 500. 00 per year, or $625.00 per month. At the time of 
|| trial, defendant was employed with Casual Furniture on a part-
ji time basis earning a gross income of $649. 80 per month, 
'although that employment was scheduled to end on December 31, 
!i 
J| 1988 and she had not yet secured replacement employment. 
Il 9. A p p l i c a t i o n of the Child Support Guidel ines 
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adopted by the courts of the State of Utah would require the 
payment of child support from the plaintiff to the defendant 
in the sum of $1, 363. 00 per month based upon plaintiff s 
income of $10,000. 00 per month until Sean attains the age of 
18 and graduates from high school with his regularly-scheduled 
graduating class. 
10. The plaintiff filed separate tax returns in 1986 
and 1987 and the defendant has not filed tax returns for those 
years. 
11. The parties acquired, during the course of their 
marriage, a home and real property located in California, to-
wit: 1767 Calle Rocas, Camarillo, California, which was the 
primary residence of the parties prior to their move to Utah 
in 1984; a home and real property located in Utah, to-wit: 
8241 Top of the World Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah; seven (7) 
lots in the state of Texas; interests in a series of pension 
plans maintained by the employer of the plaintiff, to-wit: 
Western Airlines and Delta Airlines, (these plans are the 
Western Airlines Plan A, the Western Airlines Plan B, the 
Western Airlines Plan D, the Delta Plan and the Delta Savings 
Plan); and an interest in a military retirement plan, part of 
which was earned prior to the marriage; three IRA accounts, 
one in the name of the plaintiff for $7, 546. 57, a second in 
the name of the plaintiff in the sum of $4,196. 43 and one in 
4 
;j the name of the defendant for $10, 397. 00; bank accounts at 
I; Western Federal Credit Union, Ranier Bank, Valley Bank, Mt. 
: i 
J! West Savings, and Camarillo Community Bank; 8. 6023 shares of 
il Delta stock; stock in Continental Power Co. ; furniture, 
j ; 
j i 
j; fixtures, furnishings and appliances; five guns; an IBM 
' computer and software; a 1977 Buick automobile; a 1987 Ford 
|: truck and camper; a 1980 Datsun 280Z; a 1978 ski boat; a 1982 
;' fold boat and motor; several pieces of ivory; and a 35mm 
i; 
;! camera. 
!| 12. The plaintiff testified that the precise term of 
i 
i, 
the military retirement plan is being re-examined by the 
Ij 
!I United States Navy, as plaintiff was in the Naval Reserve 
j prior to going on active duty and this period of time should 
M 
j; have been included in the plan calculations but had not, as 
of the date of trial, and this determination had been appealed 
and was being reviewed by the Navy. 
II 13. After separation of the parties, the plaintiff 
*j withdrew $33, 000. 00 from a retirement fund which was expended 
I; 
! to pay for marital debts of the parties, to-wit: $16,000.00 
i| 
|! to repay a loan $3, 400. 00 on the VISA account; $12, 500. 00 to 
pay income taxes; $1,000.00 on their daughter's wedding; and 
$600.00 to refinance the parties' home. 
14. The parties acquired various debts which remain 
unpaid, to-wit: 
Tracy Collins Bank 
Camarillo Community Bank 
Defendant's Personal Loan (attorney's fees) 
Camarillo Bank VISA 
Nordstroms 
Weinstocks 
ZCMI 
Western Federal Credit Union 
Western Federal Credit Union for camper 
Security Pacific Solar Loan 
Valley Bank VISA 
State of California taxes. 
15. The plaintiff has two life insurance policies, one 
with Delta Airlines for $100,000.00 and one with Beneficial 
i 
, Life Insurance for $100,000.00. 
j 16. The defendant employed counsel to represent her in 
i t h i s matter and does not have a ready source of assets from 
; which she can pay for the services whicfr she has secured. 
j 17. The p l a i n t i f f has a v a i l a b l e , t h r o u g h h i s 
i 
I employment, health and dental insurance and will maintain 
| health and dental insurance for Walter and Sean as long as it 
I is available through his employment. 
I From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now 
j makes and enters the following 
j CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This court has jurisdiction over the parties and 
subject matter of this action. 
| 2. Each of the parties should be awarded a Decree of 
Divorce, terminating the marriage between them on the grounds 
I of irreconcilable differences. 
3. Care, custody and control of the minor child of 
the parties, Sean Howell, should be awarded to the defendant, 
subject to reasonable rights of visitation in the plaintiff. 
4. The plaintiff should be ordered to pay child 
support to the defendant for Sean in the amount of $1, 363. 00 
per month until Sean is 18 and graduated from high school with 
his regularly-scheduled class. Payments should be made on the 
20th of each month. 
5. The income exemption for Sean should be awarded to 
the defendant. 
6. The plaintiff should be ordered to pay alimony to 
the defendant based upon the standard of living enjoyed by the 
parties at the time of their separation in 1986. Accordingly, 
he should pay her $1,800. 00 per month, one-half on the 5th of 
each month; one-half on the 20th of each month until such 
time as she dies, remarries, cohabits with a man to whom she 
is not married, or further order of the court. 
7. The parties should divide the retirement plan 
benefits acquired by them during the course of their marriage 
at the value determined by this court on December 22, 1988, by 
appropriate qualified domestic relations order, that is, the 
Western Airlines Plan A, Plan B, and Plan D, and the Delta 
Savings Plan and Delta Plan, which should be effected by 
separate orders to implement the provision of the Decree of 
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Divorce. 
8. The military retirement plan of the parties, once 
finally valued and the period of service set, should be 
divided by application of the Woodward formula. The plaintiff 
should keep the defendant advised as to the progress of this 
inquiry and the actions and decisions of the United States 
Navy. 
9. Plaintiff should be awarded the IRA in his name at 
Merrill Lynch in the amount of $7, 546. 57 and the IRA at the 
Western Federal Credit Union of $4,196.43, and the defendant 
should be awarded her IRA in the amount of $10,397.00. 
10. The plaintiff should be ordered to maintain the 
health and dental insurance that is available to him through 
his employment on both Sean and his older brother, Walter, so 
long as that insurance is available to him through the age of 
21. Each of the parties should pay one-half of any 
extraordinary medical, dental, orthodontic or eyecare expense 
which is not covered by insurance. 
11. The plaintiff has available to him life insurance 
in the sum of $100,000.00. He should be required to maintain 
Matthew and Sean as beneficiaries of that policy until they 
attain the age of 21 years or are married. After that occurs, 
he shall be free to name whomever he wishes as beneficiary of 
that insurance. To assist the children in assuring this 
8 
ji 
t : 
;l 
' coverage, the plaintiff should provide them with the policy 
\[ number and name of the insurance company. 
12. The plaintiff should be ordered to cooperate with 
• the defendant in making available to her all health insurance 
; benefits for which she can qualify under the COBRA provisions 
of the Internal Revenue Code. 
i i 
; 13. The home and real property in California, at 1767 
Calle Rocas, Camarillo, California, should be sold for the 
i best possible price and at the earliest possible time. The 
!| net proceeds of sale divided equally between the parties. 
• I There is presently a debt due to the State of California for 
|: taxes. If it is determined that those are property taxes, 
I; they should be paid from the proceeds of sale of this property 
ji prior to division of the proceeds of sale. If it is 
i; determined that those are taxes for any other reason, the 
' i 
j; plaintiff should assume and pay those taxes and hold the 
l • 
'! defendant harmless therefrom. The plaintiff should be 
i : 
i! responsible for the sale of the California home, and should 
jj keep the defendant fully advised as to that transaction, and 
ij the defendant should take all actions necessary to effect 
fi 
Ij sale. 
j| 14. The home and real property in Utah should be 
ij 
, placed for sale at the best possible price and sold at the 
i! 
Ij earliest possible date. The plaintiff should pay the 
mortgage for the months of February, March and April, 198 9, 
and if the January house payment has not been made, he should 
make that payment. Thereafter, the defendant shall be 
responsible for those payments if the home is not sold. The 
defendant shall be responsible for this sale and shall keep 
the plaintiff advised as to that transaction and the parties 
shall divide equally the net proceeds of sale. 
15. The 8. 6023 shares of Delta stock and Continental 
Power Stock should be awarded to the plaintiff. 
16. The parties should sell one of the seven lots in 
Texas and divide the net proceeds of sale between them. Each 
should be awarded three of the remaining lots. 
17. Each of the parties have accumulated savings 
accounts in their own names and they should be awarded those 
savings, to-wit: the plaintiff should be awarded the Western 
Federal Credit Union account; the Ranier Bank account; and the 
Valley Bank account, while the defendant should be awarded the 
Mountain West Savings account and the Camarillo Community Bank 
account* 
18. The insurance proceeds for the 1977 Buick should 
be awarded to the defendant who should also be awarded the 
1980 Datsun 280Z. 
19. The 1987 Ford truck and camper should be awarded 
to the plaintiff. 
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20. The 1969 Ford automobile should be awarded to 
Matthew. 
21. The 1978 ski boat should be awarded to the 
defendant. 
22. The 1982 fold boat and engine should be awarded to 
the plaintiff. 
23. Each of the parties should be awarded the 
furnishings, fixtures, furniture and appliances in their own 
possession with the exception of the IBM computer and computer 
software in the plaintiff s possession which should be awarded 
to the defendant and the 35mm camera which should be awarded 
to the plaintiff. 
24. Each of the parties should be awarded one-half of 
the ivory collection. 
25. Each of the parties should be ordered to make 
available family photographs in their possession to the other 
for copying. The photographs should be divided fairly between 
them. 
26. The plaintiff has accounted for the $33, 000. 00 he 
removed from the retirement to the satisfaction of the court 
and no order is entered in regard to those funds which the 
court believes are appropriately resolved in the division of 
the marital estate as set forth above. 
27. Each of the parties should be ordered to assume 
11 
and pay the debts in their own name with the exception of the 
mortgage provisions set forth above, which, restated, are that 
the plaintiff should pay the mortgage on the California home 
and may use the rent received from the California home until 
its sale. The plaintiff should pay the mortgage payments on 
the Utah home for February, March, and April, 1989, and the 
January payment, if that has not been paid. Thereafter, the 
defendant should be responsible for payment of that debt. 
The plaintiff should pay the debts due and owing to: 
a. Weyerhauser Mortgage (Calif, home); 
b. Western Federal Credit Union (pick-up); 
c. Western Federal Credit Union (camper); 
d. Security Pacific solar loan; 
e. Valley Bank VISA; 
f. State of California taxes. 
The defendant should pay the debts due and owing to: 
a. Lincoln Mortgage (Utah home); 
b. Tracy Collins Bank; 
c. Camarillo Community Bank; 
d. Personal loan (attorney fees); 
e. Camarillo Bank VISA; 
f. Nordstroms; 
g. Weinstocks; 
h. ZCMI. 
28. The parties should consult with an accountant 
regarding the filing of amended joint 1986 and 1987 tax 
returns. If these can be filed and the parties save money and 
secure a refund in excess of the $2, 500. 00 that has been 
received by the plaintiff, they should do so and divide all 
refunds received in excess of the $2, 500. 00 which has already 
12 
been received by the plaintiff. 
2 9. The plaintiff should be ordered to pay on behalf 
of the defendant the sum of $7, 500. 00 to assist her in the 
payment of her attorney fees within thirty (30) days from 
entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
DATED this day of , 1989. 
FRANK G. NOEL 
District Court Judge 
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APPROVED AS REFLECTING 
THE RULING OF THE COURT: 
i^*S->( 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
j! PAUL H. 1.1 API! 
'\ Attorney for Defendant 
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I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true 
copy of the above and foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, this J? ° day of CZ^^^^f, 1989, to: 
Mr. Paul Liapis 
Attorney at Law 
48 Post Office Place/ Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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HIED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAY 1 2 1989 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
of and for 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
525 East 100 South, Suite 500 
P. O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
• * * * * 
WALTER JAMES HOWELL, 
) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Plaintiff, ) 
v. ) 
BARBARA JOYCE HOWELL, ) Civil No. D87-4343 
) Judge Frank Noel 
Defendant. ) 
* * * * * 
The above-entitled matter came before the court for 
trial on Thursday, the 22nd day of December, 1988, the 
Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding. The plaintiff was present 
in person and represented by counsel, David S. Dolowitz and 
John Mason. The defendant was present in person and 
represented by counsel, Paul H. Liapis. The court heard and 
considered the testimony of the parties, received exhibits 
into evidence and determined to take the matter under 
advisement. Thereafter, being advised in the premises, the 
ft SttLTLAKECC 
  COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
EXHIBIT BL 
court announced its decision in open court on the 19th day of 
January, 1989. The plaintiff then submitted proposed Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree to the court, 
provisions of which the defendant then objected. Those 
objections were heard and resolved before the court on April 
27, 1989. Accordingly, the court, having made and entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. This court has jurisdiction over the parties and 
subject matter of this action, 
2. Each of the parties is awarded a Decree of 
Divorce, terminating their marriage. 
3. Care, custody and control of the minor child of 
the parties, Sean Howell, is awarded to the defendant, 
subject to reasonable rights of visitation in the plaintiff. 
4. The plaintiff is ordered to pay child support to 
the defendant for Sean in the amount of $1, 363. 00 per month 
on the 20th of each month until Sean is 18 and graduates from 
high school with his regularly-scheduled class. 
5. The income exemption for Sean is awarded to the 
defendant. 
6. The plaintiff is ordered to pay alimony to the 
defendant in the sum of $1,800.00 per month, one-half on the 
5th of each month; one-half on the 20th of each month until 
2 
such time as she dies, remarries, cohabits with a man to whom 
she is not married, or further order of the court. 
7. The parties shall divide the retirement plan 
benefits, valued as of December 22, 1988, acquired by them 
during the course of their marriage by appropriate qualified 
domestic relations order, that is, the Western Airlines Plan 
A, Plan B, and Plan D, and the Delta Savings Plan and Delta 
Plan, which shall be effected by separate orders to implement 
the provision of the Decree of Divorce. 
8. The military retirement plan of the parties, once 
finally valued and the period of service set, shall be 
divided by application of the Woodward formula. The plaintiff 
shall keep the defendant advised as to the progress of this 
inquiry and the actions and decisions of the United States 
Navy. 
9. Plaintiff is awarded the IRA in his name at 
Merrill Lynch in the amount of $7,546.57 and the IRA at the 
Western Federal Credit Union in the amount of $4,196.43, and 
the defendant is awarded her IRA in the amount of $10,397.00. 
10. The plaintiff is ordered to maintain the health 
and dental insurance that is available to him through his 
employment on both Sean and his older brother, Walter, through 
the age of 21, so long as that insurance is available to him. 
Each of the parties shall pay one-half of any extra-
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ordinary medical, dental, orthodontic or eyecare expense 
which is not covered by insurance. 
11. The plaintiff has available to him life insurance 
in the sum of $100,000,00. He shall maintain Matthew and Sean 
as beneficiaries of that policy until they attain the age of 
21 years or are married. After that occurs, he shall be free 
to name whomever he wishes as beneficiary of that insurance. 
To assist the children in assuring this coverage, the 
plaintiff shall provide them with the policy number and name 
of the insurance company. 
12. The plaintiff should be ordered to cooperate with 
the defendant in making available to her all health insurance 
benefits for which she can qualify under^the COBRA provisions 
of the Internal Revenue Code. 
13. The home and real property in California, at 1767 
Calle Rocas, Camarillo, California, legally described as: 
LOT 44, TRACT NO. 1359, in the County of 
Ventura, State of California, as per Map 
recorded in Book 35, Page 59 of Maps, in 
the office of the County Recorder of said 
county, 
shall be sold for the best possible price and at the earliest 
possible time. The net proceeds of sale shall be divided 
equally between the parties. There is presently a debt due to 
the State of California for taxes. If it is determined that 
those are property taxes, they shall be paid from the 
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proceeds of sale of this property prior to division of the 
proceeds of sale. If it is determined that those are taxes 
for any other reason, the plaintiff shall assume and pay 
those taxes and hold the defendant harmless therefrom. The 
plaintiff shall be responsible for the sale of the California 
home, and should keep the defendant fully advised as to that 
transaction, and the defendant should take all actions 
necessary to effect the sale. 
14, The home and real property in Utah, at 8241 Top of 
the World Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, and the adjacent lot, 
legally described as: 
(House) LOT 18, TOP OF THE WORLD #3 SUBDIVISION; 
(Lot) BEG S 84 FT FR NE COR^OT 17, TOP OF THE 
WORLD #3 SUBDIVISION; S 84 FT; E 100 FT; 
W 100 FT TO BEG. 0. 2 AC M OR L; 
shall be placed for sale at the best possible price and sold 
at the earliest possible date. The plaintiff shall pay the 
mortgage for the months of February, March and April, 1989, 
and if the January house payment has not been made, he shall 
make that payment. Thereafter, the defendant shall be 
responsible for those payments if the home is not sold. The 
defendant shall be responsible for this sale and shall keep 
the plaintiff advised as to that transaction and the parties 
shall divide equally the net proceeds of sale. 
15. The 8.6023 shares of Delta stock and Continental 
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Power Stock are awarded to the plaintiff. 
16. The parties shall sell one of the seven lots in 
Texas and divide the net proceeds of sale between them. Each 
is awarded three of the remaining lots. 
17. Each of the parties has accumulated savings 
accounts in their own names and they are awarded those 
savings, to-wit: the plaintiff is awarded the Western Federal 
Credit Union account; the Ranier Bank account; and the Valley 
Bank account, while the defendant is awarded the Mountain 
West Savings account and the Camarillo Community Bank 
account. 
18. The insurance proceeds for the 1977 Buick are 
awarded to the defendant who is also awarded the 1980 Datsun 
280Z. 
19. The 1987 Ford truck and camper are awarded to the 
plaintiff. 
20. The 1969 Ford automobile is awarded to Matthew. 
21. The 1978 ski boat is awarded to the defendant. 
22. The 1982 fold boat and engine are awarded to the 
plaintiff. 
23. Each of the parties is awarded the furnishings, 
fixtures, furniture and appliances in their own possession 
with the exception of the IBM computer and computer software 
in the plaintiff's possession which are awarded to the 
defendant and the 3 5mm camera which is awarded to the 
plaintiff. 
24. Each of the parties is awarded one-half of the 
ivory collection, 
25. Each of the parties is ordered to make available 
family photographs in their possession to the other for 
copying. The photographs are to be divided fairly between 
them, 
26. The plaintiff has accounted for the $33,000. 00 he 
removed from the retirement to the satisfaction of the court 
and no order is entered in regard to those funds which the 
court believes are appropriately resolved in the division of 
the marital estate as set forth above, 
27. Each of the parties is ordered to assume and pay 
the debts in their own name with the exception of the 
mortgage provisions set forth above, which, restated, are that 
the plaintiff shall pay the mortgage on the California home 
and may use the rent received from the California home until 
its sale. The plaintiff shall pay the mortgage payments on 
the Utah home for February, March, and April, 1989, and the 
January payment, if that has not been paid. Thereafter, the 
defendant shall be responsible for payment of that debt. The 
plaintiff shall pay the debts due and owing to: 
a. Weyerhauser Mortgage (Calif, home); 
b. Western Federal Credit Union (pick-up); 
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c. Western Federal Credit Union (camper); 
d. Security Pacific solar loan; 
e. Valley Bank VISA; 
f. State of California taxes. 
and the defendant shall pay the debts due and owing to: 
a. Lincoln Mortgage (Utah home); 
b. Tracy Collins Bank; 
c. Camarillo Community Bank; 
d. Personal loan (attorney fees); 
e. Camarillo Bank VISA; 
f. Nordstroms; 
g. Weinstocks; 
h. ZCMI. 
28. The parties are ordered to consult with an 
accountant regarding the filing of amended joint 1986 and 1987 
tax returns. If these can be filed and the parties save money 
and secure a refund in excess of the $2,500. 00 that has been 
received by the plaintiff, they shall do so and divide all 
refunds received in excess of the $2,500. 00 which has already 
been received by the plaintiff. 
29. The plaintiff is ordered to pay on behalf of the 
defendant the sum of $7, 500. 00 to assist her in the payment of 
her attorney fees within thirty (30) days from entry of the 
Decree of Divorce. 
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In re Charles Robert ROICK, a Judge of 
the Municipal Court, on Retirement. 
L.A. 31050. 
Supreme Court of California, 
In Bank. 
Dec. 6, 1978. 
BY THE COURT: 
In this proceeding, the Commission on 
Judicial Performance has filed its record 
and recommendation that Judge Charles 
Robert Roick be retired for disability within 
the meaning of California Constitution, ar-
ticle VI, section 18, subdivision (c)(1). 
Judge Roick, through his conservator, has 
waived review and requested the immediate 
entry of an appropriate order. According-
ly, it is hereby ordered that Judge Charles 
Robert Roick be retired from the Municipal 
Court, North County Municipal Court Dis-
trict, County of San Diego. (Cal Const., 
art. VI, § 18, subd. (c)(1).) This order is 
final forthwith. 
^/w\ 
Co I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
154 Cal.Rptr. 413 
In re the MARRIAGE OF Elayne C. and 
Leon J. EPSTEIN. 
Leon J. EPSTEIN, Respondent, 
v. 
EJayne C, EPSTEIN, Appellant 
S.F. 23933. 
Supreme Court of California. 
April 12, 1979. 
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing 
May 17, 1979. 
In marital dissolution proceeding, the 
Superior Court, Marin County, Charles R. 
Best, J., divided community property and 
awarded spousal support, and wife appeal-
ed. The Supreme Court, Tobriner, J., held 
JE OF EPSTEIN Cal. 1165 
P.2d 1165 
that: (1) rule that spouse is generally not 
entitled to reimbursement for separate 
funds utilized to meet community obliga-
tions does not apply to expenditures subse-
quent to separation; (2) case had to be 
remanded to trial court for resolution of 
factual questions determinative of whether 
sums expended by husband after separation 
to preserve and maintain family residence 
were paid to fulfill husband's support obli-
gations; (3) capital gains tax, if any. in-
curred as a result of sale of residence had to 
be considered so as to equalize division of 
community property after payment of tax; 
(4) trial court erred in failing to require 
husband to reimburse community for com-
munity funds withdrawn by him to pay 
estimated taxes on his 1973 separate prop-
erty income; (5) trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in fixing spousal support at $750 
per month, and (6) trial court abused its 
discretion in terminating spousal support as 
of April 15, 1981, in view of absence of 
evidence that wife would be self-supporting 
by that date. 
Reversed in part and affirmed in part. 
Vacating 83 Cal.App.3d 55, 147 Cal. 
Rptr. 595. 
1. Husband and Wife <®=>262.1(4) 
There exists presumption that, unless 
agreement between parties specifies that 
contributing party be reimbursed, party 
who utilizes his separate property for com-
munity purposes intends a gift to the com-
munity. 
2. Husband and Wife <s=>265 
Although spouse is generally not enti-
tled to reimbursement for separate funds 
utilized to meet community obligations, 
that rule does not apply to expenditures 
subsequent to separation. 
3. Husband and Wife <s=>4 
Husband and wife assume mutual obli-
gation of support upon marriage, and this 
obligation is not conditioned on existence of 
community support or income but, in fact, 
upon exhaustion of community property or 
income, spouse must utilize his or her sepa-
EXHIBIT C 
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rate property to provide for the support of 
the other. West's Ann.Civ.Code, §§ 242, 
5100, 5132. 
4. Husband and Wife <$=»4 
Upon exhaustion of community proper-
ty or income, spouse must utilize his or her 
separate property to provide for the support 
of the other, and no statutory right man-
dates reimbursement for such expenditures. 
West's Ann.Civ.Code, §§ 242, 5100, 5132, 
5. Divorce <$=> 252.3(2) 
A spouse who, after separation of par-
ties, uses earnings or other separate funds 
to pay preexisting community obligations 
should be reimbursed therefor out of com-
munity property upon dissolution unless 
there exists circumstances indicating that 
reimbursement is inappropriate, such as 
where payment was made under circum-
stances in which it would have been unrea-
sonable to expect reimbursement or where 
payment on account of preexisting commu-
nity obligation constituted in reality dis-
charge of the paying spouse's duty to sup-
port the other spouse or a dependent child 
of the parties; disapproving contrary lan-
guage in In re Marriage of Fischer, 78 
Cal.App.3d 556, 146 Cal.Rptr. 384. 
6. Divorce <s=*287 
Where, following separation, husband 
expended sums to preserve and maintain 
family residence, but where trial court did 
not determine whether husband's payments 
constituted in reality a discharge in part of 
his obligation of support, whether parties 
separated by agreement, whether they en-
tered into an agreement for support, and 
whether husband should be estopped from 
denying that his payments were in dis-
charge of his duty to support, case had to be 
remanded to superior court for additional 
findings concerning whether husband was 
entitled to reimbursement. West's Ann. 
Civ.Code, § 5131. 
7. Divorce <s=> 252.5(3) 
Trial court's division of community 
property should take account of any taxes 
initially paid as a result of court-orderecl 
sale of residence. 
8. Divorce ®=>252.3(2) 
Where sale of parties' residence occurs 
as a result of enforcement of trial court'.: 
order dividing community property and 
where there exists possible future tax bur-
den since if parties use proceeds to purchase 
new residence, resulting deferral of capital 
gains tax will reduce basis of new residence, 
thereby possibly resulting in higher tax 
when and if new residence is sold, possible 
future tax burden is an example of specula-
tive and uncertain tax consequences which 
trial court need not consider in dividing 
community property. West's Ann.Rev. & 
Tax.Code, § 18095; 26 U.S.C.A. (I.R.C.1954) 
§ 1034(e). 
9. Divorce <®=>254(1) 
Where trial court's order dividing com-
munity property stated that, following re-
imbursement to husband for traceable sepa-
rate funds used to maintain residence, bal-
ance of residence sale proceeds "shall be 
divided between the parties in a fashion 
which will equalize the division of the par-
ties' community property," judgment was 
susceptible of construction consistent with 
principle that balance of proceeds should be 
divided so as to equalize division of commu-
nity property after payments of any capital 
gains tax incurred upon sale of residence. 
10. Divorce e=*265 
When husband utilizes community 
funds to pay taxes relating to his separate 
property income, he must reimburse com-
munity for such sums. 
11. Divorce <s=> 252.3(2) 
Where, after separation, husband with-
drew $2,250 from savings account, conceded 
to contain only community funds, to make 
his quarterly estimated income tax payment 
on his 1973 salary and where all of hus-
band's income earned during 1973, being 
postseparation, was his separate property 
and hence entire tax obligation attributable 
to his 1973 earnings was his separate debt, 
trial court erred in failing to charge hus-
band's share of community property for 
$2,250 withdrawn from savings account. 
West's Ann.Civ.Code, § 5118. 
12. Divorce <s=>235 
A trial court may abuse its discretion if 
it accords to one spouse a continued stan-
dard of living significantly higher than it 
accords to the other. 
13. Divorce <3=> 240(1), 308 
Where husband's overall net income 
amounted to $2,600 per month, where hus-
band claimed expenses totaling $1,750 per 
month, including $350 per month to meet 
cost of parties' daughter's college education, 
where this left available income of $850 per 
month, a sum less than the $950 awarded in 
combined spousal and child support, and 
where husband's income was inadequate 
both to sustain two separate households at 
standard of living previously enjoyed by 
parties and to provide for daughter's college 
education, trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in awarding wife $950 in combined 
spousal and child support. 
14. Divorce c=> 245(1) 
Where wife had no employment or job 
training since 1954, where, prior to her mar-
riage in 1954, wife had held only brief and 
intermittent unskilled positions, where, al-
though wife had earned bachelor of arts 
degree and expressed willingness to seek 
employment, she required considerable 
training before she would be qualified to 
compete in the job market, where, at time 
of trial, wife was 48 years old without any 
specific employment opportunities available 
to he/, and where record was devoid of 
evidence justifying inference that wife 
would be self-supporting on or after April 
15. 1981, trial court's decision to terminate 
jurisdiction to amend spousal support after 
April 15, 1981 was an abuse of discretion. 
15. Divorce c=>247 
Award of support beyond husband's 
mandatory retirement date would not have 
conflicted with equal division of community 
property requirement of Civil Code section 
subdivision. West's Ann.Civ.Code, 
§ 4800(a). 
16. Divorce <®=> 252.3(2) 
There is no requirement excluding hus-
band's half of community property as a 
source of future award of spousal support. 
West's Ann.Civ.Code, § 4800(a). 
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Roy A. Sharff, Stephen Adams, San 
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for appellant. 
Savitt & Adams, Verna A. Adams and 
Nancy Sevitch, San Rafael, for respondent. 
TOBRINER, Justice. 
In this marital dissolution proceeding 
both husband and wife challenge various 
rulings of the trial court. We state briefly 
our conclusions with respect to the issues 
raised. 
First, we explain that although a spouse 
is generally not entitled to reimbursement 
for separate funds utilized to meet commu-
nity obligations, that rule does not apply to 
expenditures subsequent to separation. Ac-
cordingly, husband may claim reimburse-
ment for sums expended after separation to 
preserve and maintain the family residence, 
unless such sums were paid to fulfill hus-
band's support obligations. The case must 
be remanded to the trial court for resolu-
tion of the factual questions determinative 
of that issue. 
Second, the trial court ordered the family 
residence sold and the proceeds, after re-
payment to husband of reimbursable ex-
penditures, divided in a fashion that would 
equalize the division of the community 
property. We interpret this language as 
permitting the court, upon the remand of 
this cause, to take into account the capital 
gains tax, if any, incurred as a result of 
that sale so as to equalize the division of 
community property after payment of that 
tax. 
Third, the trial court erred in failing to 
require the husband to reimburse the com-
munity for community funds withdrawn by 
him to pay estimated taxes on his 1973 
separate property income. 
Finally, while we find no abuse of discre-
tion in the court's order fixing spousal sup-
port at $750 per month, its order terminat-
ing that support as of April 15, 1981, in the 
absence of evidence that wife will be self-
supporting by that date, conflicts with our 
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recent decision in In re Marriage of Morri-
son (1978) 20 Cal.3d 437, 143 Cal.Rptr. 139, 
573 P.2d 41. 
1. Summary of facts. 
The parties were married on August 8, 
1954, and separated on April 15, 1972. At 
the time of trial wife was 48 years old and 
husband was 57. There were 2 children of 
the marriage, a daughter, over 18 years old 
at the time of trial and in college, and a 
son, age 16, residing with wife. 
Wife has had no employment or job train-
ing since 1954. Before marriage she had 
held a temporary job as a doctor's recep-
tionist for six months, had worked for her 
father for a brief period in his business, and 
for a wholesale firm in Los Angeles for 
slightly less than a year. She had a B.A. 
degree from the University of California, 
where she had majored in social work. Al-
though she had not sought employment or 
job training during the two-and-one-half-
year interval between separation and trial, 
attributing this fact to the demands of run-
ning the family home and responsibility for 
the children, she intended to seek job train-
ing and employment in the future. 
The husband, a professor of psychiatry at 
University of California Medical School, 
also engages in part-time private practice 
of psychiatry. His gross income from all 
sources in 1973 totalled $67,000; his net 
income from all sources after taxes, retire-
ment and deduction for certain health and 
life insurance'premiums amounted to about 
$31,200. 
After the parties separated, husband con-
tinued to provide to his wife approximately 
$650 every month and in addition paid 
utilities, telephone, department store bills, 
gardener, gasoline card, house insurance, 
douse taxes, ancf mortgage payment, fn 
February 1974, he modified his monthly 
payments, paying $950, from which wife was 
expected to pay the expenses husband had 
previously paid in addition to other inci-
dental expenses. Throughout the pendente 
lite period wife and the son, David, re-
mained in the family residence while hus-
band made all the mortgage, insurance, 
and tax payments on the home.° Wife 
Maintains that because of this arrangement 
s
^$ never sought an order for support 
Pendente lite. 
The trial court allowed the husband reim-
bursement for the money spent to maintain 
t^s family residence during the separation 
Period. It refused, however, to order the^  
community reimbursed for community 
f^nds used by husband to pay estimatea* 
taXes on his postseparation income although 
t
^at income was husband's separate proper-
ty. 
The court divided the community proper-
ty awarding husband community personal 
Property worth $98,509.60 and wife commu-
nity personal property worth $19,695.55. It 
d^ected sale of the family residence, valued 
a t $140,000. It ordered the proceeds of the 
sa4e applied first to reimburse husband for 
^ceable separate funds used to maintain 
t^at asset, with the balance "divided be-
tween the parties in a fashion which will 
dualize the division of the parties' commu-
m ty property." 
finally, the trial court awarded spousal 
sukport to wife in the amount of $750 per 
m(
*nth, retroactive to January 1, 1975, and 
cohtinuing through April 14, 1981. The or-
de
** provided that spousal support would 
tehninate on April 15, 1981, and the court 
w%ld retain no further jurisdiction to 
award spousal support. The court also or-
dered husband to pay child support for the 
Parties' son living with the wife, in the sum 
o f
 $200 a month. The award of child sup-
P°rt terminated on August 23, 1976, when 
^ son reached the age of 18. 
5. Husband is entitled to reimbursement 
for separate funds utilized to pre-
serve and maintain the family resi-
de/zee uxJess paid to d/scfasge 2i/s 
duty of support. 
I'l] Our decision in See v. See (1966) 64 
CaL2d 778, 51 Cal.Rptr. 888, 415 P.2d 776 
established a presumption that, unless an 
a£l-eement between the parties specifies 
the contributing party be reimbursed, 
a
 barty who utilizes his separate property 
*
or
 community purposes intends a gift to 
t n
^ community. Thus we said in See, "The 
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basic rule is that the party who uses his 
separate property for community purposes 
is entitled to reimbursement from the com-
munity or separate property of the other 
only if there is an agreement between the 
parties to that effect." (64 Cal.2d at p. 785, 
51 CaLRptr. at p. 893, 415 P.2d at p. 781; 
Weinberg v. Weinberg (1967) 67 Cal.2d 557, 
570, 63 Cal.Rptr. 13, 432 P.2d 709.) 
[2] This court, however, has not previ-
ously addressed the applicability of this no-
reimbursement rule to the situation in 
which, after separating, the party uses his 
separate property for payments on preexist-
ing community obligations. Upon examina-
tion we think the no-reimbursement rule in 
See does not apply in such a situation. 
Justification for the See presumption lies 
in the natural characteristics and legal inci-
dents of the marital relationship. The 
strength of "the natural feelings of mutual 
affection and generosity presumably at-
tending the marital state" (In re Marriage 
of Smith (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 725, 746, 145 
Cal.Rptr. 205, 215) may alone provide a 
basis for the inference that expenditures of 
separate property in behalf of the commu-
nity are intended as gifts. 
[3,4] The legal incidents of marriage, 
however, provide an additional basis for 
such an inference. Husband and wife as-
sume a mutual obligation of support upon 
marriage. (See 'fciv.Code, § 5100.) This 
obligation is not conditioned on the exist-
ence of community property or income. In 
fact, upon exhaustion of the community 
property or income a spouse must utilize his 
or her separate property to provide for the 
support of the other. (Civ.Code, §§ 242, 
5132.) As we noted in See v. See, supra, 64 
Cal.2d 778, 784, 51 Cal.Rptr. 888, 415 P.2d 
776, no statutory right mandates reimburse-
ment for such expenditures. 
Similarly, we held that if a husband dur-
ing marriage elects to utilize his separate 
property instead of community property to 
meet community expenses he may not claim 
reimbursement. The absence of a statutory 
l- At the time of our decision husband had both 
management and control of the community 
property (former Civ.Code, § 172) as well as 
the right to select the mode of living (former 
right to reimbursement together with basic 
equity considerations1 led us to conclude 
that the husband acts with a donative in-
tent that transmutes his separate property 
into community property. (See v. See, su-
pra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 785, 51 Cal.Rptr. 888, 
415 P.2d 776.) 
[5] The recent Court of Appeal opinion 
in In re Marriage of Smith, supra, 79 Cal.3d 
725, 145 Cal.Rptr. 205, however, held 'hat 
the no-reimbursement rule of See v. See did 
not apply to payments made after the 
spouses have separated. Upon considera-
tion of that matter, we agree with the 
conclusion of In re Marriage of Smith, and 
adopt as the view of this court the follow-
ing portion of the Court of Appeal opinion 
of Justice Kaufman: 
"The rule denying reimbursement in the 
absence of an agreement therefor is based 
largely on the presumption the paying 
spouse intended a gift. (See See v. See, 
supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 785, 51 Cal.Rptr. 888, 
415 P.2d 776; cf. Dunn v. Mullan, 211 Cal. 
583, 589-590, [296 P. 604, 77 A.L.R. 1015]; 
Ives v. Connacher, supra, 162 Cal. 174 at p. 
177, 121 P. 394.) . . . When the par-
ties have separated in anticipation of disso-
lution of the marriage, the rational basis for 
presuming an intention on the part of the 
paying spouse to make a gift is gone. 
"Moreover, the practical realities are that 
almost all married couples have incurred 
debts which are customarily paid out of 
their earnings and that, upon separation of 
the parties, their earnings, the usual, and 
perhaps only, liquid community asset avail-
able for payment of debts, become their 
respective separate property (Civ.Code, 
§ 5118). . [W]hen, after separa-
tion, one of the spouses makes payments on 
preexisting community debts out of earn-
ings or other separate funds, if the no-reim-
bursement rule is applied, the result is that 
community obligations which would other-
wise be charged against community proper-
ty and borne by the parties equally are 
Civ.Code, § 156). It was considered inequita-
ble to allow the husband to burden the commu-
nity assets by consistently living beyond the 
means of the community. 
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charged exclusively to the paying spouse. 
Thus, application of the no-reimbursement 
rule will discourage payment of community 
debts after separation, exacerbate the fi-
nancial and emotional disruption which all 
too frequently accompanies the breakup of 
a marriage and, perhaps, result in impairing 
the credit reputations of both spouses. 
"So, we are persuaded the rule disallow-
ing reimbursement in the absence of an 
agreement for reimbursement should not 
apply and that, as a general rule, a spouse 
who, after separation of the parties, uses 
earnings or other separate funds to pay 
preexisting community obligations should 
be reimbursed therefor out of the communi-
ty property upon dissolution. However, 
there are a number of situations in which 
reimbursement is inappropriate, so reim-
bursement should not be ordered automati-
cally. 
"Reimbursement should not be ordered if 
payment was made under circumstances in 
which it would have been unreasonable to 
expect reimbursement, for example, where 
there was an agreement between the par-
ties the payment would not be reimbursed 
or where the paying spouse truly intended 
the payment to constitute a gift or, general-
ly, where the payment was made on 
account of a debt for the acquisition or 
preservation of an asset the paying spouse 
was using and <<£he amount paid was not 
substantially in excess of the value of the 
use. 
"Likewise, reimbursement should not be 
ordered where the payment on account of a 
preexisting community obligation constitut-
ed in reality a discharge of the paying 
spouse's duty to support the other spouse or 
a dependent child of the parties. Both 
spouses have a duty to support their de-
2. Language contrary to these views in In re 
Marriage of Fischer (1976) 78 Cal App 3d 556, 
561-562, 146 Cal Rptr. 384 is disapproved 
3. Bruch, The Legal Import of Informal Marital 
Separations: A Survey of California Law and a 
Call for Change (1977) 65 Cal L.Rev. 1015, 
1030-1031, calls for legislative amendment of 
section 5131; the writer argues that the statute 
would more closely conform to the reasonable 
expectations of separated spouses if it provided 
pendent children. (Civ.Code, §§ 242, 4700.) 
Similarly, the spouses owe to each other 
mutual duties of support. (Civ.Code, 
§§ 242, 5100, 5132.) Following separation, 
the preferred source for payment of sup-
port is the separate property of the support-
ing spouse that would have been communi-
ty property if the spouses were not separat-
ed. (Civ.Code, § 4805.) Payment of a debt, 
of course, may constitute payment of spous-
al or child support. (See Gay v. Gay, 146 
Cal. 237, 243, 79 P. 885; Bushman v. Superi-
or Court, 33 Cal.App.3d 177, 181-183, 108 
Cal.Rptr. 765; In re Hendricks, 5 Cal. 
App.3d 793, 797-798, 85 Cal.Rptr. 220; cf. 
Civ.Code, § 4358.) When in fact it does, 
reimbursement is inappropriate. (See v. 
See, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 784, 51 Cal.Rptr. 
888, 415 P.2d 776.)" (79 Cal.App.3d at pp. 
746-748, 145 Cal.Rptr. at pp. 215-216.) 
(Fns, omitted.)2 
[6] In the instant case the trial court did 
not determine whether husband's payments 
constituted in reality a discharge in part of 
his obligation of support Husband, how-
ever, maintains that we need not remand 
the cause for a finding on this issue because 
under Civil Code section 5131 he owed no 
obligation of support. 
Civil Code section 5131 provides that "A 
spouse is not liable for the support of the 
other spouse when the other spouse is living 
[apart] from the spouse by agreement un-
less such support is stipulated in the agree-
ment." 3 To invoke the protection of this 
section, therefore, husband must prove both 
(a) that the spouses separated by agree-
ment, and (b) that this agreement contained 
no provision for support. The trial court 
rendered no finding on either point, and the 
evidence adduced on the matter is equivo-
cal.4 
that the duty of support continues after separa-
tion unless there is an agreement to the con-
trary 
4. The parties testified to an "arrangement" un-
der which husband paid mortgage, insurance, 
real property taxes, and other expenses. 
Whether this evidence is sufficient to prove an 
implied contract for support is an issue for the 
trial court. We note also a dearth of evidence 
on whether the parties separated "by agree-
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Because this case was tried before In re 
Marriage of Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.3d 
725, 145 Cal.Rptr. 205, the parties did not 
orient their presentation of evidence to the 
issues which Smith found to be crucial to 
the husband's right to reimbursement, and 
the trial court rendered no findings on 
those issues. The issues thus left unre-
solved include the crucial question whether 
husband's payments for maintenance of the 
family home were made in discharge of his 
support obligation5 which may turn on the 
subsidiary questions whether the parties 
separated "by agreement" (Civ.Code, 
§ 5131), whether they entered into an 
"agreement" for support within the mean-
ing of that section, and whether husband 
should be estopped, as wife claims, from 
denying that his payments were in dis-
charge of his duty to support.6 All of these 
are issues for the trier of fact, not matters 
which can be resolved by an appellate court. 
We therefore perceive no alternative to re-
manding this case to the superior court for 
additional findings.7 
3. Upon remand of this case the trial 
court should take into account the 
capital gains tax, if any, incurred by 
the parties as a result of the sale of 
the family residence. 
The trial court ordered the family resi-
dence sold and the 'proceeds divided be-
tween the parties, less the reimbursement 
to husband discussed in part 2 of this opin-
ion, in such a manner as to equalize the 
ment," although arguably such an agreement 
might be inferred from the subsequent conduct 
of the parties. 
5. "There occur to us several considerations 
pertinent to the determination whether a given 
payment was in reality in discharge of the 
paying spouse's duty to support. Where the 
payment was made pursuant to a court order, 
if the order specifies whether or not reimburse-
ment is to be had, naturally the order will 
control. The advisability of including such a 
specification in every order for payment of 
debts is obvious. Where the court order does 
not specify whether or not reimbursement is to 
be had or where the payment made was not 
required by a court order, the determination 
will be made on the basis of the relevant facts 
and circumstances. However, two prime con-
division of the community property. Since 
husband received personal property of sub-
stantially greater value than that awarded 
wife, she will receive the larger share of the 
proceeds from the sale of the house. 
[7] The trial court's order does not men-
tion the possibility that the parties might 
incur state and federal capital gains tax 
liability as a result of the sale of the resi-
dence. Noting that equalization of commu-
nity property shares before taxes may re-
sult in her receiving less than half of the 
net value of community property remaining 
after payment of taxes, wife contends the 
trial court erred by not expressly consider-
ing tax liability in its order. We agree with 
wife that the court's division of community 
property should take account of any taxes 
actually paid as a result of the court-or-
dered sale of the residence, but explain that 
this result can be achieved merely by con-
struing the trial court's order, without need 
to posit error by the court below. 
In re Marriage of Fonstein (1976) 17 
Cal.3d 738, 131 Cal.Rptr. 873, 552 P.2d 1169, 
we held that the trial court, in assigning to 
husband the value of his interest in a law 
partnership, need not take into account the 
tax that might be incurred if husband at 
some uncertain future date sold that inter-
est. We there declared that "Regardless of 
the certainty that tax liability will be in-
curred . the trial court is not re-
quired to speculate on or consider . 
tax consequences in the absence of proof 
siderations will obviously be whether or not 
there was a need for spousal or child support at 
the time the payment was made and whether 
or not the payment made was in addition to 
reasonable support already being provided by 
the paying spouse either pursuant to or in the 
absence of a court order." (In re Marriage of 
Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.3d at p. 748, 145 
Cal.Rptr. at p. 216.) 
6. Wife contends that she relied on husband's 
payments on the family home and consequently 
did not seek a court order for support. 
7. We leave to the discretion of the trial court 
whether to reopen the proceedings for addition-
al evidence or to render findings on the existing 
record. 
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that a taxable event has occurred during 
the marriage or will occur in connection 
with the division of the community proper-
ty.11 (17 Cal.3d at p. 749, fn. 5, 131 Cal. 
Rptr. at pp. 879-880, fn. 5, 552 P.2d at pp. 
1175-1176 fn. 5; see Weinberg v. Weinberg, 
supra, 67 Cal.2d 557, 566, 63 Cal.Rptr. 13, 
432 P.2d 709.) (Emphasis added.) 
Unlike Fonstein, which involved a specu-
lative future tax liability arising on the 
hypothetical sale of an asset, in the present 
case the taxable event, the sale of the resi-
dence, occurs as a result of the enforcement 
of the court's order dividing the community 
property. In this respect the case at bar 
resembles In re Marriage of Brigden (1978) 
80 Cal.App.3d 380, 145 Cal.Rptr. 716, and In 
re Marriage of Clark (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 
417, 145 Cal.Rptr. 602. In both cases the 
trial court awarded husband community 
property corporate stock, but ordered him 
to give wife a promissory note to equalize 
the division of community property; in fix-
ing the value of the note, however, both 
trial courts failed to consider that state and 
federal taxing authorities would treat the 
property division as a sale of wife's interest 
in the stock and impose a capital gains tax 
on the proceeds of the note. On these facts 
the Court of Appeal in Brigden and Clark 
ordered the trial court to revise its award to 
take into account the wife's tax liability. 
When husband in Clark argued that Fon-
stein precluded consideration of the capital 
gains tax because the amount of the tax 
could not be immediately determined,8 the 
Court of Appeal rejected his contention and 
directed that "[i]n order to equalize division 
of the community property, [husband] 
&. The Internal Revenue Code treats the award 
or* the stock to husband, offset by a promissory 
note from him to wife, as the sale of wife's half 
interest in the stock, a sale which is subject to 
capital gains tax. Because husband undertook 
to pay the note in installments, the tax is 
spread over the years in which wife received 
the payments, and thus the amount of the tax 
turned in part on her taxable income in such 
years. (See discussion in In re Marriage of 
Clark, supra, 80 Cai.App.3d 417, 422 and fn. 3, 
145 Cal.Rptr. 602.) 
9. Amendments enacted subsequent to the trial 
of this case extended the period for reinvest-
ment of the proceeds to 18 months. 
should pay one-half of the capital gains tax 
caused by the transaction." (80 Cal.App.3d 
at p. 424, 145 Cal.Rptr. at p. 607.) 
[8] In cases such as the instant matter 
involving the sale of a family residence, the 
uncertainty concerning the amount of capi-
tal gains tax liability stems from provisions 
in state and federal tax law which defer 
liability to the extent that the proceeds 
from the sale are reinvested in a new resi-
dence within one year of the sale. (Rev. & 
Tax.Code, § 18091; Int.Rev.Code, 
§ 1034(a).)9 That uncertainty, however, 
will be resolved within a year or two of the 
court's decree.10 In the present case, the 
amount of the tax liability may have been 
fixed by events pending the decision of this 
appeal, so the trial court, upon the remand 
of this case made necessary by our holding 
on the husband's right of reimbursement, 
can recognize that liability in dividing the 
proceeds of the sale. If not, and in similar 
cases arising in the future, the court can 
take account of tax liability by providing 
that the liability incurred, if any, is owed 
equally by both spouses. In unusual cases, 
it could retain jurisdiction to supervise the 
payment of taxes and adjust the division of 
the community property. (See In re Mar-
riage of Clark, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d 417, 
424, 145 Cal.Rptr. 602.) 
[9] The trial court's order states simply 
that, following reimbursement to husband, 
"the balance of said sale proceeds shall be 
divided between the parties in a fashion 
which will equalize the division of the par-
ties' community property." We do not 
\D. If tne parties use the proceeds to purchase a 
new residence, the resulting deferral of the cap-
ital gains tax reduces the basis of the new 
residence. Depending upon future events, that 
reduction in basis may result in a higher tax 
when and if the new residence is sold. (Rev. & 
Tax.Code, § 18095; Int.Rev.Code, § 1034(e).) 
That possible future tax burden, however, is an 
example of the speculative and uncertain tax 
conseauences which the trial court need not 
consider under In re Marriage of Fonstein, su-
pra, 17 Cal.3d 738, 749, 131 Cal.Rptr. 873, 552 
P.2d H60.) 
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think it necessary to interpret that order as 
rejecting consideration of the tax conse-
quences of the sale, and then to brand the 
order so construed as erroneous. The judg-
ment is susceptible of a construction con-
sistent with the principles declared in this 
opinion. (See 4 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (2d 
ed. 1971) pp. 3209-3210.) We therefore 
construe the judgment to provide that the 
balance of the proceeds be divided so as to 
equalize the division of the community 
property after payment of any capital gains 
tax incurred upon the sale of the residence, 
and direct that the trial court, upon the 
remand of this case, so apply the judgment. 
4. The community is entitled to reim-
bursement for community funds used 
to pay husband's tax liability for his 
separate income.11 
In January of 1974 husband withdrew 
$2,250 from a savings account at the Crock-
er Bank, conceded to contain only communi-
ty funds, to make his quarterly estimated 
income tax payment on his 1973 salary. All 
of husband's income earned during 1973, 
being postseparation, was his separate prop-
erty. (Civ.Code, § 5118.) Hence the entire 
tax obligation attributable to his 1973 earn-
ings was his separate debt. Yet in dividing 
the remaining community funds held in the 
account the tr/al court deducted the $2,250 
from the balance of the account on the date 
of separation. Husband was therefore not 
required to reimburse the community for 
the use of funds to meet his separate prop-
erty obligations. 
[10,11] When a husband utilizes com-
munity funds to pay taxes relating to his 
separate property income he must reim-
burse the community for such sums. 
(Somps v. Somps (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 328, 
338, 58 Cal.Rptr. 304; Estate of Turner 
11. In parts 4, 5, and 6 of this opinion our 
decision follows the opinion prepared by Judge 
Sater for the Court of Appeal in this action 
with only minor changes in wording. 
12. We are aware of husband's contention that 
the $2,250 withdrawn frOm the Crocker 
account should be offset by the deposit of his 
unused vacation paycheck into the Gibralter 
(1939) 35 Cal.App.2d 576, 96 P.2d 363.) We 
conclude that the trial court erred in failing 
to charge husband's share of the community 
property for the $2,250 withdrawn from the 
Crocker Bank account12 
5. The trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion limiting spousal support to 
$750 per month. 
[12,13] "Although not unlimited, a +rial 
court's discretion is broad in setting the 
amount of spousal support to be awarded 
upon dissolution of marriage." (In re Mar-
riage of Morrison, supra, 20 Cal.3d 437, 454, 
143 Cal.Rptr. 139, 150-151, 573 P.2d 41, 
52-53.) Although a court may abuse its 
discretion if it accords to one spouse a con-
tinued standard of living significantly high-
er than it accords to the other (see In re 
Marriage of Andreen (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 
667, 671-672, 143 Cal.Rptr. 94), we cannot 
agree with wife's contention that the trial 
court here abused its discretion in failing to 
provide her with support sufficient to main-
tain her past standard of living. 
The record discloses that husband's net 
income from his salary, after mandatory 
deductions and medical and life insurance 
premiums amounted to $2,471 a month; i. 
e., $29,632 per year. In 1973 he netted an 
additional $9,700 from his private practice 
but $9,000 went to pay taxes that were due 
because he was "under withheld" on his 
salary. The trial court concluded husband's 
overall net income amounted to $2,600 per 
month. He claimed expenses totaling 
$1,750 per month, including $350 per month 
to meet the cost of the parties' daughter's 
college education. This left an available 
income of $850 per month—a sum less than 
the $950 awarded in combined spousal and 
child support. 
savings account. Approximately two-fifths or 
$2,051 of this $5,000 check was husband's sep-
arate property. In dividing the funds in the 
Gibralter account, however, the trial court ap-
portioned only the $13,839.12 in the account at 
the time of separation. Thus, the additional 
balance in the account at the time of trial 
remained husband's separate property. 
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The trial court in the present case was 
unable to provide fully for the anticipated 
expenses of both parties. Husband's in-
come is inadequate both to sustain two sep-
arate households at the standard of living 
previously enjoyed by the parties and to 
provide for the daughter's College educa-
tion. We cannot say that the court abused 
its discretion in fairly attempting to allo-
cate the available income to meet the finan-
cial needs of both parties.13 
6. The trial court abused its discretion in 
terminating jurisdiction to modify 
support as of April 15, 1981. 
[14-16] The trial court ordered spousal 
support to terminate on April 15, 1981, 
without retaining jurisdiction to award fur-
ther support after that date. The trial 
court entered its order without the benefit 
of our recent decision in In re Marriage of 
Morrison, supra, 20 Cal.3d 437, 143 Cal.Rptr. 
139, 573 P.2d 41. In Morrison we deter-
mined that: "A trial court should not ter-
minate jurisdiction to extend a future sup-
port order after a lengthy marriage, unless 
the record clearly indicates that the sup-
ported spouse will be able to adequately 
meet his or her financial needs at the time 
selected for termination of jurisdiction. In 
making its decision concerning the reten-
tion of jurisdiction, the court must rely only 
on the evidence in the record and the rea-
sonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. 
13. Wife maintains that husband currently has 
an increased ability to pay spousal support due 
to the availability of tax deductions for such 
support, the termination of child support and 
the reduction in his expenses because mort-
gage, tax and insurance payments on the fami-
ly home will no longer be required Husband 
in turn asserts we should evaluate wife's lack 
of effort to become self-supporting during the 
postseparation period We hold only that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion at the 
time of judgment Both parties may in the 
future present further evidence to the trial 
court on a motion to modify spousal support 
At such time the court should reconsider the 
needs, circumstances and financial status ot 
the parties 
14. We cannot accept husband's contention that 
an award of support beyond his mandatory 
retirement date (July 1, 1984) would conflict 
with the equal division of community property 
It must not engage in speculation. If the 
record does not contain evidence of the 
supported spouse's ability to meet his or her 
future needs, the court should not 'burn its 
bridges' and fail to retain jurisdiction." (20 
Cal.3d at p. 453, 143 Cal.Rptr. at p. 150, 573 
P.2d at p. 52; In re Marriage of Stenquist 
(1978) 21 Cal.3d 779, 789, 148 Cal.Rptr. 9, 
582 P.2d 96.)14 
The record in the instant case is devoid of 
evidence justifying an inference that wife 
would be self-supporting on or after April 
15, 1981. At the time of trial she was 48 
years old without any specific employment 
opportunities available to her. Although 
she had earned a Bachelor of Arts degree 
and expressed a willingness to seek employ-
ment, she would need to undertake con-
siderable training before she would be qual-
ified to compete in the job market. Prior 
to the marriage wife had held only brief 
and intermittent unskilled positions. 
On the basis of this record the trial court 
could only speculate as to wife's ability to 
meet her financial needs on April 15, 1981. 
The trial court's decision to terminate juris-
diction should be deferred until the facts 
demonstrate whether further support is 
warranted. (In re Marriage of Stenquist, 
supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 790, 148 Cal.Rptr. 9, 
582 P2d 96.) We conclude that the trial 
court abused its discretion in divesting it-
self of jurisdiction to amend spousal sup-
port after April 15, 1981.15 
requirement of Civil Code section 4800, subdi-
vision (a) The tnal court's order terminates 
spousal support almost three years prior to the 
date of husband's retirement Moreover, even 
if a future award of spousal support must come 
from husband's half of the community property 
there is no requirement excluding such proper-
ty as a source of that support As the Court of 
Appeal below noted, "in every case where one 
spouse receives permanent spousal support 
from the other spouse, the source is from the 
separate property of the paying spouse, includ-
ing earnings or property which were 
once the community property of both spouses " 
Husband's financial position may be re-exam-
ined if necessary at the time of his retirement 
in light of both parties' circumstances. 
15. We hold only that the tnal court erred in 
divesting itself of jurisdiction to award spousal 
support after April 15, 1981. The portion of 
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7. Conclusion. 
The portion of the trial court order grant-
ing husband reimbursement for traceable 
funds he has expended during the period of 
the parties' separation to preserve and 
maintain the family home is reversed, and 
the cause is remanded to the trial court for 
further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. The portion of the trial court or-
der terminating jurisdiction to award spous-
al support commencing April 15, 1981, is 
reversed. The portion of the trial court 
order dividing the community property is 
reversed to the extent that it fails to pro-
vide for reimbursement to the community 
for community funds used by husband to 
pay his separate tax liability. Interpreting 
the portion of the order directing sale of the 
family residence and division of the pro-
ceeds to require an equal division of com-
munity property after payment of any capi-
tal gains tax liability incurred by reason of 
the sale, we affirm that portion of the 
order, but the trial court is directed on 
remand of this cause to divide the commu-
nity property to attain the aforementioned 
equal division. In all other respects the 
judgment is affirmed. 
BIRD, C. J., and MOSK, CLARK, RICH-
ARDSON, MANUAL and NEWMAN, JJ., 
concur. 
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the award terminating spousal support as of 
April 15, 1981, remains valid, but the trial court 
154 Cal.Rptr. 423 
Clemens A. HACKETHAL, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Arthur S. WEISSBEIN, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
Clemens A. HACKETHAL, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Irving L. SPRATT, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
Clemens A. HACKETHAL, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
J. Lamont MURDOCH, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
L.A. 31016. 
Supreme Court of California, 
In Bank. 
April 12, 1979. 
Hearing Denied May 17, 1979. 
Doctor sued witnesses, who testified 
against him in hearing before judicial com-
mission of private medical society, on 
ground that the testimony was negligently 
given and was motivated by malice. The 
Superior Court, San Bernardino County, 
Don A. Turner, J , sustained demurrers on 
ground that the alleged defamatory publi-
cations were absolutely privileged and 
plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Newman, J , held that: (1) hearing before 
the commission was not an "official pro-
ceeding authorized by law," within statute 
providing that privileged communication is 
one made in legislative or judicial proceed-
ing or in any other official proceeding au-
thorized by law, and (2) statute extending 
qualified privilege to communications that 
are intended to aid in evaluation of qualifi-
cations of a doctor, if communications are 
addressed to hospital, hospital medical staff 
and professional society, medical school, 
professional licensing board, peer review 
must retain jurisdiction to modify that award if 
economic circumstances warrant. 
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In re the MARRIAGE OF Andrew J. 
BECK, Petitioner and Appellant, 
and 
Doris Beck, Respondent and Respondent 
No. 80-286. 
Supreme Court of Montana. 
Submitted on Briefs Feb. 17, 1981. 
Decided July 9, 1981. 
Husband appealed from that portion of 
a judgment of marriage dissolution of the 
District Court, Third Judicial District, Pow-
ell County, Robert Boyd, J. P., as divided 
the parties' property. The Supreme Court, 
Shea, J., held that: (1) the trial court's 
findings of the husband's net annual income 
and the value of the marital estate were not 
supported by the evidence; (2) where a 
property distribution included a taxable 
event precipitating a concrete and immedi-
ate tax liability, that tax liability had to be 
considered by the court before entering its 
final judgment; (3) in making its equitable 
distribution, the trial court properly did not 
set aside the husband's joint tenancy trans-
fer to the wife of an undivided one-half 
interest in ranch property. 
Vacated and remanded. 
1. Divorce <$=> 253(3) 
In marriage dissolution proceeding, tri-
al court's finding that husband would have 
net annual income of $21,000 and that value 
of marital estate was $760,000 were not 
supported by the evidence. 
2. Appeal and Error «=» 1010.1(1) 
Findings and conclusions may not rely 
solely on perceived lack of credibility, but 
they must be supported by evidence. 
3. Divorce <s=»252.3(5) 
Where property distribution ordered by 
court in marriage dissolution case included 
taxable event precipitating concrete and 
immediate tax liability, that tax liability 
had to be considered by the court before 
entering its final judgment. 
4. Divorce <s=>286(8) 
In marriage dissolution proceeding, 
husband's joint tenancy transfer to wife of 
undivided one-half interest in ranch was not 
due to be set aside, with only $15,000 ac-
quired by parties during their marriage 
through sale of two bars being subject to 
equitable distribution between parties, in 
light of fact that both parties were in ill 
health and not able to find gainful employ-
ment. 
Leaphart Law Firm, Helena, for petition-
er and appellant. 
Daniels & Mizner, Deer Lodge, for re-
spondent and respondent. 
SHEA, Justice. 
Andrew J. Beck appeals from that por-
tion of a judgment of the Powell County 
District Court dividing the parties' property 
as a result of a marital dissolution. He 
contends that the trial court's findings and 
conclusions are not supported by the evi-
dence, that the court failed to consider the 
tax consequences of its property division, 
and that the court should not have con-
sidered certain assets which the husband 
brought into the marriage to be marital 
property subject to division. 
Although we rule that the trial court 
could properly consider the assets v hich the 
husband had brought into the marriage, we 
nonetheless must vacate the judgment and 
order a new hearing. The findings and 
conclusions are not supported by the evi-
dence. Further, the court should have con-
sidered the tax consequences of the proper-
ty division. 
Andrew J. Beck (husband) and Doris 
Beck (wife) were married in 1966 in Elko, 
Nevada. It was the third marriage for 
each of them. Both had children from pre-
vious marriages, but no children were born 
to them during this marriage. 
At the time of their'marriage, the hus-
band owned a substantial amount of ranch 
property in Powell County, identified as the 
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Gold Creek property, the Red Hills proper-
ty, and the Larabie Ranch. 
During the marriage, the husband grant-
ed the wife, by joint tenancy deed, an undi-
vided one-half interest in the Larabie ranch 
property. It is approximately 760 acres and 
was appraised at $393,462.80. Most of the 
land, has been leased to others. In 1980, 
they received $14,000 in rental from the 
land, but in 1981, the rental income in-
creased to approximately $16,000 per year. 
During the marriage, the husband sold 
the Gold Hills property under two contracts 
for deed, one to Don Beck, and the other to 
Ronald Cunningham. Payment from both 
land contracts is assigned to the First Se-
curity Bank of Deer Lodge and the Federal 
Land Bank of Missoula. In this appeal, the 
husband contends that neither party re-
ceives income from the contracts. The 
wife, however, contends that the husband 
will receive a significant amount of cash 
from these two contracts under the proper-
ty distribution ordered by the trial court. 
Her claim is unsubstantiated. 
The Red Hills property contains about 
2,100 acres and is subject to a life estate in 
Andrew A. Beck (the father of the petition-
er-husband here). The fair market value of 
this property has been appraised at $247,-
386. 
The husband and wife acquired other 
property during their marriage, in particu-
lar, two baijr that they later resold for 
profit. These bars were purchased with the 
husband's funds but were improved by the 
wife's efforts before they were resold. 
The only evidence regarding the value of 
the property was introduced by the hus-
band. The trial court adopted the wife's 
proposed findings and conclusions almost in 
toto. We consider here only the major find-
ings covering the division of the property. 
The only evidence of the property value 
was introduced by the husband, as previous-
ly stated. He also introduced the only evi-
dence of the debts of the parties. The 
undisputed evidence was that the Larabie 
ranch property had a value of $393,462.80, 
and that the Red Hills property had a fair 
market value of $247,386. The total estate 
was valued at $740,573.95. The trial court 
adopted the wife's proposed finding that 
the total value of the estate is $760,000. 
The husband introduced evidence that the 
proceeds from the contract for sale of the 
Gold Hills property were unavailable to ei-
ther the husband or wife because they were 
assigned to a bank. The husband's account-
ant testified that the contract payments 
from the Don Beck contract were "com-
pletely assigned to the First Security Bank 
in Deer Lodge and the Federal Land Bank 
in Missoula." Under cross-examination, the 
accountant testified that the First Security 
Bank mortgage on the property had been 
paid off, but that the bank was holding the 
contract proceeds under an assignment un-
til the parties' other unspecified indebted-
nesses to the bank were paid off. The 
accountant also testified that the proceeds 
from the Cunningham contract were also 
assigned to these banks. This testimony 
was uncontradicted. In fact, the only evi-
dence introduced by the wife concerning 
their income was that they received $14,000 
per year from rentals on the Larabie place. 
The undisputed evidence is that the par-
ties have an indebtedness of approximately 
$92,000. The husband introduced into evi-
dence a cash-flow chart showing that the 
annual income of the parties was $23,583, 
including the income from the Larabie 
property. This evidence was uncontradict-
ed. 
Adopting the wife's proposed findings, 
the trial court awarded the wife the Lara-
bie ranch (valued at $393,000) together with 
the right to receive the rental income (now 
$16,000 per year). 
The court awarded the rest of the proper-
ty to the husband—the Red Hills property 
(valued at $247,386, but subject to a life 
estate), and the Gold Hills property—being 
sold to Don Beck and Ronald Cunningham 
under contracts for deed. The trial court 
also ordered the husband to pay all debts of 
the parties, amounting to over $92,000. 
The trial court based this order in part on a 
finding that the husband would have an 
annual income of $23,583 per year. The 
court found his income to be sufficient to 
support the husband and also for him to pay 
all income taxes, mortgages, attorney fees, 
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and miscellaneous indebtednesses of the 
parties, amounting to over $92,000. The 
uncontradicted evidence, however, is that 
the husband's annual income is only $9,000 
per year, and from this he must not only 
support himself but pay approximately $92,-
000 in bills. 
The error lies in the failure of the trial 
court to recognize an error, pointed out in 
the motion, for a new trial, that the $23,583 
annual income figure for the husband was 
based in part on $14,000 rental income of 
the Larabie ranch property. The court, 
however, not only awarded this ranch to the 
wife, but also awarded her the rental in-
come, thereby cutting the income available 
to the husband to a little over $9,000 per 
year. The uncontradicted evidence is that 
the lease payments from the Larabie ranch 
amount to the greatest portion of the total 
income available for distribution to the par-
ties. From this $9,000 annual income, the 
husband must meet his own living expenses 
plus pay off over $92,000 of the debts. 
Following entry of judgment, the hus-
band moved for a new trial on the grounds 
that the findings and conclusions were un-
supported by the evidence, and also because 
in entering the decree, the court failed to 
consider the tax consequences of the prop-
erty division. The motion was initially no-
ticed up for hearing, but a later minute 
entry indicates that the hearing was vacat-
ed upon stipulation of the parties. Both 
sides presented affidavits in support of 
their position on the motion for a new trial. 
In her counter-affidavit resisting the hus-
band's motion for a new trial, the wife 
attested that the trial court's property divi-
sion left the husband several sources of 
income which could furnish him with over 
$25,000 annually. The wife's allegations 
are, however, partially speculative in nature 
and wholly unsupported by the evidence. 
These alleged amounts of income are not 
set forth in the record. The wife has point-
ed to absolutely no evidence in the record 
either supporting the trial court's findings 
nor refuting the husband's contentions that 
the property division left him with only 
$9,000 in yearly income. 
The motion for a new trial was not again 
noticed up for hearing, and the trial court 
took no action on the motion. As a result, 
under Rule 59(d), M.R.Civ.P., the motion 
was deemed denied ten days after the wife 
served her counter-affidavit. A timely no-
tice of appeal was filed, and this appeal 
followed. 
[1] With no support in the record, the 
wife baldly asserts that the husband will 
have a gross annual income of $37,000, and 
that he will have a net annual income of 
$21,000. She bases this argument in part 
on an unfounded premise that proceeds 
from the Gold Hill contracts are subject to 
mortgage payments to the Federal Land 
Bank in the amount of only $16,000 annual-
ly. The record supports neither the gross 
annual income of $37,000 nor the $16,000 
annual mortgage payments. 
[2] The only evidence supports a finding 
that the husband would have an annual net 
income of just over $9,000. Further the 
only evidence supports a finding that the 
value of the marital estate is $740,673.95 
rather than the figure of $760,000 set by 
the trial court at the suggestion of the wife. 
The trial court could have arrived at these 
findings or conclusions only if it disbelieved 
portions of the husband's evidence, but if 
the trial court did not believe this evidence, 
it was not free to arbitrarily set figures not 
supported by the evidentiary record. Find-
ings and conclusions may not rely solely on 
a perceived lack of credibility; rather, they 
must be supported by evidence. See, In Re 
Marriage of Lippert (1981), Mont., 627 P.2d 
1206, 38 StRep. 625. 
The conflict between the evidence and 
the findings resulted from the trial court's 
wholesale adoption of the wife's proposed 
findings and conclusions. We recently dis-
approved of such a practice. See, Tomaskie 
v. Tomaskie (1981), Mont, 625 P.2d 536, 539, 
38 StRep. 416, 419, citing Canon 19, Canons 
of Judicial Ethics, 144 Mont, at xxvi—xxvii. 
See also, Louis Dreyfus & CIE v. Panama 
Canal Co.y (5th Cir. 1962), 298 F.2d 733, 737; 
and Roberts v. Ross (3rd Cir. 1965), 344 F.2d 
747, 751-752, which persuasively set forth 
reasons why the trial court should do its 
own work when drafting final findings and 
conclusions. 
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transfer to the wife of an undivided one-
half interest in the Larabie ranch must be 
set aside." The only purpose of that trans-
fer, he argues, was to benefit the widow if 
the husband should die, and, because they 
are now divorced, that purpose has been 
mooted. He therefore asks that the one-
half interest be set aside and the Larabie 
ranch be restored to him as the donor. 
Section 40-4-202, MCA, specifically di-
rects the court to equitably apportion be-
tween the parties property "belonging to 
either or both, however and whenever ac-
quired and whether the title thereto is in 
the name of the husband or wife or both." 
This statute refutes the husband's argu-
ment, and we need not say more. An un-
contested fact is that the trial court found 
both parties to be in ill health and not able 
to find gainful employment. Dividing only 
the $15,000 profit realized from the sale of 
the bars is not our idea of an equitable 
property division. 
The judgment is vacated and this cause 
remanded for further proceedings consist-
ent with this opinion. 
[3] Because the findings are clearly er-
roneous (see Rule 52(a), M.R.Civ.P.), we 
must set them aside and vacate the judg-
ment. There is another reason, however, to 
vacate the judgment. As the result of the 
property division ordered by the court, the 
husband moved for a new trial based in 
part on his claim that some harsh tax conse-
quences would befall him and that the trial 
court had failed to consider these tax conse-
quences. While we need not detail the tax 
consequences here, for we order a new 
hearing in any event, we take this occasion 
to hold that where a property distribution 
ordered by a court includes a taxable event 
precipitating a concrete and immediate tax 
liability, such tax liability should be con-
sidered by the court before entering its 
final judgment. 
In Re Marriage of Gilbert (1981), Mont., 
628 P.2d 1088, 38 StRep. 743, we held that 
a District Court does not abuse its discre-
tion by refusing to consider theoretical tax 
consequences when the court-ordered prop-
erty distribution does not contemplate any 
taxable event which triggers present tax 
liability. But where a present tax liability 
will be triggered by the court-ordered dis-
tribution, the court must make allowance 
for such tax impact. Other courts have 
held that a property distribution must make 
allowance for the tax impact incurred by a 
husband on account of a court-ordered 
transfer of an interest in real property to 
the wife. See, e. g., Wahl v. Wahl (1968), 
39 Wis.2d 510, 159 N.W.2d 651. See gener-
ally, Annot, Divorce or Separation: Consid-
eration of Tax Liability or Consequences in 
Determining Alimony or Property Settle-
ment Provisions, 51 A.L.R.3d 461. We hold, 
therefore, that at a new hearing, the trial 
court must consider any concrete and imme-
diate adverse tax impact that a division of 
marital property might have on the parties. 
[4] A final issue raised by the husband 
is that only $15,000 acquired by the parties 
during their marriage through the sale of 
two bars is subject to equitable distribution 
between the parties. He argues that he 
owned the property before the marriage 
and it should still be his upon the dissolu-
tion of the marriage. Therefore, he asks 
this Court to rule that the joint tenancy 
DALY, HARRISON, 
SHEEHY, JJ., concur. 
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